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ABSTRACT
Drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence from the commercial sex market in Singapore,
this thesis examines how this important but poorly understand market functions and how the agents
who participate in it behave.
The first chapter analyzes this industry from an institutional perspective. I explore a set of en-
dogenous and exogenous reasons for why both legal and illegal prostitution exists in the red light
district and yet functions differently. In addition, I examine why street prostitution and prostitution
in the bars are both illegal but very different in organization. These apparently distinct questions
are answered by common factors. The distribution of power among pimps in these segments and
the laws governing prostitution emerge as the key causes, capable of explaining the contractual
differences, labor mobility, network structure, and profit allocation rules across the segments.
The second chapter examines and contrasts competing theories developed by Becker (1957) and
Diamond (1971). My empirical findings fail to support Becker’s prediction that discrimination can
not survive in a competitive equilibrium. Instead, they favor Diamond’s model in which discrimi-
nation can persist in a competitive equilibrium when there is even a modest search cost. Moreover,
sex workers engage in statistical discrimination based on their perception of clients’ willingness to
pay and practice taste-based discrimination based on clients’ traits like skin tone.
v
The third chapter is a case study on how information completeness affects bargaining efficiency
using bargaining data between sex workers and clients in the commercial sex market. I find bar-
gaining efficiency is greatly enhanced as uncertainty diminishes. When comparing the transactions
of repeat clients with those of tourists, I find that for the repeat clients, their offers are 25% more
likely to be accepted immediately, the bargaining process is concluded 1 minute faster and the
transaction is 17% less likely to fail. These changes in efficiency are independent of the venue
where bargaining takes place. In addition, sellers are more proactive in approaching buyers and
initiating offers. Identity of initiator does not influence the bargaining duration. However, when
the sex worker initiates the transaction, there is a reduction in bargaining failures.
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Chapter 1
Institution of Commercial Sex Market
1.1 Introduction
The commercial sex market, while a multi-billion-dollar economy, is perhaps the most understudied
market in the world. According to Dank [2014], Kara (2009) estimates that the global commer-
cial sexual exploitation of victims generated $51.3 billion in revenues in 2007. The total revenue
generated in eight major U.S cities from this industry totaled $873 million in 2007. However, rel-
atively little economic research has been carried out in this market, and this is especially true for
the commercial sex market in Asia. Asia hosts numerous sex hubs and is the essential location
of global sex trading. Singapore, the Asian city-state, is famous for its red light district, which is
characterized by diverse supply and demand. Sex workers from over ten countries serve clients
from over seven ethnic backgrounds (see Table 1.1).
The commercial sex market in Singapore is a highly differentiated service market. Legal pros-
titution as well as diverse forms of illegal prostitution flourish. Both legal brothels and street
prostitution is concentrated in the red light district, Geylang, making it the heart of the sex work
in Singapore. Located in the most bustling street in the city, the Orchard Tower bars is an enter-
tainment complex famous for hosting prostitutes1. This set of nightclubs composes the high-end
market segment which offers entertainment services with brisk sex trading behind the scenes. Each
market segment possesses distinct characteristics and complements each other to meet the diverging
1See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchard_Towers
2demands through service specialization. Within each segment, prostitution activities are geograph-
ically clustered, which both dramatically increases the competition and information transmission
and lowers the client’s search cost.
I am fortunate to be able to connect to the insider network in this mysterious market and collect
both qualitative and quantitative information. I observe two interesting phenomena: first, both
legal brothels and street prostitutes are both concentrated in the low-end market, yet display many
differences; second, both Geylang street prostitution and Orchard Tower prostitution are illegal yet
differ greatly in organization and network. I find that exogenous reasons like Singapore’s laws
governing the sex market,as well as endogenous reasons like the pimps’ power distribution have
collectively contributed to the observed similarities and differences. As a result of these root causes,
different collaboration schemes, profit sharing rules, network structures and labor mobility prevail
across the segments in this market.
The sections are organized as following: I start with a literature review of economic prostitution
studies in section 1.2, , which is followed by an overview of the commercial sex market in Sin-
gapore in section 1.3. In section 1.4 and section 1.5, I separately discuss the determinants of the
observed differences between the street and legal segments, as well as the street and Orchard Tower
bars. Lastly, I conclude in section 1.6.
1.2 Prostitution Literature
In social science literature, there is an abundance of works published on prostitution. Many debates
and studies on prostitution concern issues such as the legalization of prostitution, human traffick-
ing[Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer, 2013] and health risks associated with STD infections. Most of
these works are policy papers and created by large research institutions. However, within the disci-
pline of economics, there are very few research studies carried out to rigorously study sex workers
and the commercial sex industry. This is mainly due to restricted accessibility of the market and
3availability of data. Here, I briefly review economic research that has occurred on this topic.
There is relatively little theoretical work on prostitution. Edlund and Korn [2002] are among the
first lay out the economic theoretical foundation of prostitution.. In their seminal work, they con-
nect the marriage market to the sex market, by assuming the reproduction needs and promiscuity of
the men and the scarcity of fecund women in the market. They formalize the economic definition of
prostitution as a profession that is low-skill, labor-intensive, female, and well paid. They argue that
the high wages of prostitutes are compensation differential for forgoing their marriage market op-
portunity and contribution. Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Strøm [2009] build a theoretical model
of prostitution incorporating the impact of social stigma on the behavior of sex workers and clients.
Like Edlund’s work, this paper also arrives at the prediction that there will be less prostitution in
a society when there is an increase in wages. Farmer and Horowitz [2013] examine the institution
of the commercial sex market by analyzing how the existence of intermediaries (i.e pimps, brothel
managers) shift the market surplus.
The majority of work devoted to studying prostitution are empirical papers, many of which are de-
voted to understanding sex workers’ earning premiums and the determinants of the price of sexual
services. Arunachalam and Shah [2008] were the first to test some of Edlund et al’s predictions.
They used data on legal sex workers from Mexico and Ecuador and showed that sex workers do
earn wage premiums. But, against Edlund et al, they found that sex workers were more likely to
get married than non-sex workers at a younger age when the wage premium is the highest. Gertler,
Shah, and Bertozzi [2005] built a simple but beautiful theoretical model analyzing a particular kind
of wage premium and risk premium that sex workers gain with non-condom use. They found the
risk premium sex workers earn is 23 percent for each unprotected transaction, with attractive sex
earners earning as high as 46 percent. Islam and Smyth [2010] ) observed a 15 percent beauty
premium in the Bangladeshi prostitution market. Rao, Gupta, Lokshin, and Jana [2003] with a key
concern placed on HIV-AIDS prevention programs, investigate the impact of condom use on price
in India using a survey from Calcutta prostitutes. Moffatt and Peters [2004] were the first to explore
the determinants of the price and compensation differential in the UK using data extracted from
4Internet sites. They verify a positive correlation between earnings from prostitution and alternative
employment based on economic prediction.
Other well known work on prostitutes include the studies of Levitt and Dubner [2010] and Levitt
and Venkatesh [2007] which explore the bribery dynamics between sex workers and policemen and
describe how the entire prostitution industry is interrelated with crimes in Chicago’s sex market.
Several papers study the factors that affect the supply and demand in the female prostitution market
for heterosexual services. Cunningham and Kendall [2011a] took the United States’ political con-
ventions as a natural experiment and used Internet advertisements as a proxy of the labor supply.
They show that the convention caused a 29-44 percent increase in ads in Minnesota and a 47-77
percent increase in ads in Denver. In addition, their study highlighted the importance of focusing
on men in transit when studying the transmission of STDs. Cameron and Collins [2003] used a
UK lifestyle dataset to identify the characteristics of the males that determine their demand for
prostitute service.
Another set of studies focuses on the institution and regulation issues. For instance, technology
helps to shape the urban prostitution scene, on both the street level and within indoor venues,
and this process changes the way prostitutes accept risky transactions [Cunningham and Kendall,
2011b]. Gertler and Shah [2011] show that strict enforcement helps to achieve a desired STI rate
and therefore, this model of regulation could also lead the labor movement across the sectors in
the prostitution market. There is little attention paid to the less widespread but growing market of
male prostitution. Cameron, Collins, and Thew [1999] use the UK Guy Times advertisement data
to investigate the characteristics the male escorts in relation to the types of services offered.
1.3 Overview of Commercial Sex Market in Singapore
All segments of the commercial sex market in Singapore run independently providing female pros-
titutes to male clients. The population of prostitutes can be broadly categorized into four main
5groups: legal brothel prostitutes, street walkers in Geylang, freelancers in Orchard Tower Bars
and dancers/singers/hostess in nightclubs. Geylang is the renowned red light district in Singapore.
All the prostitution activities concentrate in the even-lanes between lorong (lane/street) 2 to 30
within Geylang. It is the biggest segment in this market consisting of both legal brothels and illegal
prostitutes.
1.3.1 Legal Brothels
The legal sector is largely represented by a set of legal brothels in Geylang. Legal brothels are
run by managers who are typically ex-convicts. They operate under a special business license
granted by government authorities, which guarantees the brothel’s legality. The issuance of such
business permits for brothels helps police authorities exercise a tighter control of this otherwise
underground activity, as well as providing employment opportunities for the ex-convicts who have
special knowledge about this market but face gloomy job market prospects in the formal sector.
The government ceased to issue licenses in 2000, leaving over 100 legal brothels operating in red
light district.
The legal brothels are identified by a big unit number on the lighted box or the unit. Brothel
business runs from daily from 12:30pm to midnight. Each brothel employs about 8-12 sex workers
with several very attractive sex workers as marketing devices. Prostitutes from regulated brothels
hold health cards and are subject to a bi-weekly health checkup. They receive a certificate or work
permit granting them the legitimacy to work as prostitutes within the brothels. Legal prostitutes are
full-time sex workers who work and reside inside the brothels. The majority of the legal prostitutes
are from Malaysia and China, and women from Thailand and India can also be found occasionally.
The Thai sex workers mostly work in Thai style brothels between lane 4 and lane 12. Both the
legal sex workers and pimps are strictly prohibited from public soliciting and are mandated to keep
all business activities in-house. This also means that clients do not incur additional motel room
costs when buying services from brothel. Exempted from police raids and controlled for health
6risks, legal brothels are the preferred destinations for safe and clean commercial sexual services in
Singapore.
1.3.2 Hierarchical Illegal Market
The illegal segments are more scattered and more diverse in forms. They operate in parallel but
follow a hierarchical market structure. Hierarchy is defined by sorted matching between heteroge-
neous supply and demand.
Geylang
Geylang is most famous for its street prostitutes. The sex workers mostly concentrate in a small
area of 100x500 meters. The majority of freelance street sex workers solicit independently but are
collectively overseen by pimps, depending on the areas of their business. Each lorong (lane) is
controlled by a pimp who oversees the business and coordinates with his look-outs or other pimps
to avoid police raids. Prostitutes attached to a pimp are only allowed to solicit in his territory. This
leaves prostitutes without pimps at a great disadvantage, because they receive no protection and
face unexpected threats from unknown pimps. There is a small fraction of Geylang prostitutes who
are invisible on the streets. They are a less popular group of prostitutes, like Indonesian women,
and are often hidden indoors. They rely on pimps to get clients and they sell sexual services at a
very low rate.
Illegal prostitutes in Geylang use tourist visas to re-enter Singapore from time to time. The duration
of each stay is about one month. Chinese and Vietnamese sex workers dominate the scene and are
patronized by mostly Singaporean men, Caucasian men and Bangladeshi construction workers.
There are also some Singaporean Indian women working in Geylang and they mainly trade with
Indian or Bangladeshi men. As a place for cheap sexual services, Geylang is a favorite destination
for construction workers and other less well-off clients. The plentiful supply of Chinese women
also makes Geylang the preferred choice of senior Chinese-speaking clients.
7Orchard Tower
In the middle tier, there are bars in the famous Orchard Tower, which is a well-known tourist attrac-
tion for nightlife. It is situated on Singapore’s most bustling street, Orchard Road, and is famous
for its name of “Four Floors of Whores.” The four floors in Orchard Tower are full of nightclubs
and pubs. Most of the prostitutes gather at one of the biggest bars located on the second floor. It is
a popular place for higher-end freelancers to solicit clients. In addition, some freelancers solicit on
the street near the entrance of Orchard Tower building. Visitors can find prostitutes from Southeast
Asian countries (mostly Thai and Vietnamese girls) and Eastern Europe here. These freelancers are
relatively cheaper and do not solicit inside of the building because they lack networks. Networks
play a vital role in the market structure and equilibrium outcome in this sub-market.
Due to the short operation hours of the bars, prostitutes in Orchard Tower work for about 6 hours
a day, from late night until early morning. This market also has a higher barrier of entry, as
the prostitutes have to pay a $10 drink coupon and present their password to enter into the bars.
Because of limited working hours and the high fixed cost, prostitutes in the bars are more proactive
than those on the street2.
These prostitutes face a right-shifted demand curve in Orchard Tower in comparison with street
prostitutes in Geylang. It is equally costly for customers to enter the Orchard Tower market. They
are required to pay for the admission fee and purchase over-priced drinks in order to enjoy the
leisure time in the bars and to buy the opportunity to meet with high-quality prostitutes. The higher
market price of sexual services reflects the wealth of the customers and the high quality of the
prostitutes.
While client ethnicity is used as a key indicator for prostitutes to determine the client’s reservation
price on Geylang street, it plays a less influential role in bars as prostitutes have more channels to
assess clients. The bar environment grants a safe platform for the prostitutes and clients to screen
2An insider reveals that about 60-70% of the prostitutes will proactively approach the men. On average, 50% of the
male customers are local Singaporeans and rest are made up expatriates (Caucasians, Indians. Middle Eastern men and
sailors from US Navy). Only half of the male customers will proactively approach the women.
8each other, as well as negotiate price. Prostitutes can assess a man’s wealth and intention to buy
by his willingness to chat and his decision to purchase drinks for her. The bargaining structure
differs in bars as compared to Geylang street. On average, the bargains in the bar take longer
than a typical bargain on the street. This is not only because the bar is a safe venue in which to
solicit prostitutes but also because the bar is filled with an excessive supply of prostitutes. It is
almost costless for clients to chat/shop around. It is common that the players pause negotiations
when prices are not agreed upon and both clients and prostitutes continue with their search while
keeping the paused negotiation in mind. The negotiation may resume if both the client and the
prostitute are unsuccessful in reaching another deal. The prolonged bargaining time works in favor
of clients, as their motivation for patronizing the bars is to enjoy the time spent chatting with girls.
However, this is very time consuming for prostitutes, which why they sell less in any given day and
their price for services is higher.
Nightclubs
At the top of the market hierarchy, there are entertainers (dancers, singers and hostesses) from
nightclubs working as part-time sex workers. These sex workers are legal foreign workers in Sin-
gapore. The nightclubs apply for work permits for these workers under the title of “art performers.”
They are mostly from Taiwan, China, Thailand and Eastern Europe. As compared to the street
market, the prostitution activities in this segment are well-covered under the disguise of the legal
nightclubs, but they are equally as rampant. By working in the nightclubs, the sex workers enjoy
protection against police raids and immigration officers.
Nightclubs are not illegal brothels per se. Rather, they provide a base for entertainers to cultivate
potential sexual deals. The clubs aim to generate lawful revenues from customer spending in the
clubs. Dancers, hostesses and singers are the instruments the nightclubs employ to spur clients to
consume. Clubs strictly forbid workers to exchange sex for money within the club but turn a blind
eye to such acts outside of clubs. These entertainers are self-employed when working as prostitutes.
9Unlike the prostitutes in Geylang and Orchard Tower, prostitutes in nightclubs receive base salary
of $1400 per month from the club. They are mandated to meet a certain sales target each month,
and their total salary depends on their sales commission. Their ultimate responsibility is to make
customers to buy women’s drinks or order bottles of wine for the table, as well as to motivate
customers to purchase flower rings for them. Since the women are selected to lure customers,
they often have better looks, figures and communication skills than those working in Geylang and
Orchard Tower. Club entertainers work on average eight hours, from late night to early morning.
There are two key reasons for the entertainers from clubs to sell sex. First, their base salary is low
and generating sufficient income through commission is not easy. Selling sex is a complementary
strategy, an easy way to make money, especially when they have direct contact with clients. Sec-
ondly, entertainers in the club also compete for flower rings. The customers have the option to buy
flower rings at a price of S$50-S$500 for the entertainers they are interested in. Hence, entertainers
are inclined to go out with clients who show their support by lavishing money on them. Prostitutes
can earn substantial compensation by going out with the clients who are capable of supporting
them. Equally important, the women view it as a chance to build a formal relationship with the
client so that the possibility of marriage may become realized at some point in the future, for a
change of life.
The majority of the regular customers are locals, Singaporean Chinese, while most of the irregular
customers are expatriates (Caucasians, Thai, Taiwanese). Customers who patronize clubs are fi-
nancially established and often bring business partners to the club for entertainment. It is common
for local Singaporeans to spend a lot money on wines and flowers for the girls they like. However,
Caucasian customers rarely buy the flower rings and are more inclined to buy the women’s drinks.
In addition, some clubs hire floor managers (i.e. the mama san) to manage the dancers. Managers
strive to meet their sales target by coordinating the interactions between the dancers and the cus-
tomers as well as facilitating the sales, as they can take a share of the sales of dancers make. Often,
managers also act as the facilitator for matching clients with sexual services and they act as the
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middleman for the price negotiation.
Miscellaneous segments
Besides the aforementioned venues, prostitutes can also be found in other areas and venues. KTV3
is not commonly seen in Singapore, but the ones that are operating are often are engaged with
prostitution activities. Prostitutes in KTV are managed by the manager in the KTV, therefore they
have less freedom to decide the work hours, prices and customers. The owner of KTV is subject
to a jail sentence if caught running prostitution business during a police raid. Massage girls offer
massage services followed by sexual services for a “tip.” Massage girls enjoys the benefit of an
“early-warning” system, where a warning will be granted to the parties in the middle of the service
if the police are on the way, so they can present the appearance of a legal massage service when
the police reach the door. There are hundreds of massage parlors throughout the city with entrance
fees ranging from 28 to 80 dollars. Most of them are licensed business premises with Public
Entertainment licenses. The ones that located within the red light district tend to provide illegal
prostitution services. In addition, cyber-prostitution has been gaining in popularity as technology
becomes more pervasive. It is less understood as it is less publically visible.
Empirical Facts
The price of a prostitute is primarily determined by her beauty, figure, and skills among other
things. Prices vary across prostitutes depending on her overall qualifications. The common rate in
a legal brothel is fixed at S$50 per 20 minutes, half of which goes to brothel owner. It is typical
for a legal brothel prostitute to serve 10-20 customers a day with the average service duration of
20 minutes. The rate is $50 per 20 minutes for Thai brothels and $150 per 45 minutes for Chinese
brothels. On Geylang street, the service rate floats around S$30-S$200 with a median price of $60
and standard deviation of $35 for street walkers.
There is an income gap and a revised saving gap between attractive and less attractive groups.
3KTV refers Karaoke television, a form of interactive musical entertainment establishment where clients and enter-
tainers can sing and drink and mingle. With few exceptions, the many of KTV host prostitution or related activities.
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Beautiful sex workers from the high-end segment make substantially more income than the street
sex workers. The street sex workers are frugal and save at least 90% of the income for remittance,
while the high-end sex workers tend to spend a lot on luxury goods and tobacco and have low or
no savings.
1.4 Legal Brothel v.s Illegal Street Prostitution
Legal brothels and illegal street prostitution in Geylang are comparable counterparts. They share
many similarities but also operate in different ways. They are direct competitors, both serving the
low-end of the market with nearly substitutable services. Geylang is a less affluent district with
relatively widespread illegal activities, and it hosts businesses targeting the lower-end of demand.
This kind of business environment does not encourage wealthy individuals to patronize the sex
workers. In addition, both segments share similarities in market structure.
On the upper tier, there is competition among the brothels themselves as well as from the pimps
on the street; on the lower tier, there is competition among the prostitutes. Prostitutes are solely
responsible for production; the competition strategies are developed by managers on the upper tiers.
This market structure is derived from the presence of mafia power in Geylang dating back decades
ago. Even though the influence of the mafia over the area has been reduced over the years under
strong law enforcement, the legacy of the mafia power remains. While some of the ex-convicts
were granted licenses to operate legal brothels, others who cannot or do not want to secure legal
employment opportunities became pimps on the street.
While the similarities can be explained by geographic adjacency of these two segments, the dif-
ferences between the two are the results of prostitution law and power distribution of the pimps. I
now elaborate distinct features between street prostitution and legal prostitution.
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1.4.1 Fixed Cost and Information Sharing
Due to the legality of the brothels, they must confine all prostitution activities in-house, which
forces brothel owners to rent villas to run the business. Maintaining a villa is an essential fixed
cost to the brothel managers. This fixed cost limits the production capacity in-house. Without
capacity constraints, the manger will pick only beautiful prostitutes, as it is the most profitable
product composition. However, attractive women are scarce commodities, and managers have to
optimize their product selection. They tackle the problem by maintaining a certain ratio of beautiful
prostitutes and complement it by sharing demand information and engaging in joint production.
Brothels face stochastic demand. When a manager cannot match a client’s requirement in-house,
he turns to other related brothels and shares this demand information. His counterpart can react
either by declining the offer or by collaborating and supplying a sex worker to meet the client’s
demand. Once the service is rendered, the brothels will split the proceeds from this joint production.
Such cooperation is only practiced by brothels that have close relationships because it is costly for
brothels to disclose private information if joint production is not undertaken. In the long run,
the true type of brothel will be revealed through repeated games, and brothels will be eventually
matched or not matched to a partner brothel and false signaling is not sustainable in the equilibrium.
In stark contrast, the law prohibits illegal street pimps from hosting prostitution activities in an
establishment, which helps them avoid high fixed costs as brothel managers. However, illegality
brings street pimps other competitive disadvantages. They face regular police surveillance and a
risk of being arrested. The fact that all initial engagements and negotiations between the prostitutes
and clients takes place on a public street inflates the value of information about police raids. On
the street, there are few very powerful pimps (backed by their mafia gangs) who have a dominant
influence on a large area and many less powerful pimps who control their own lanes. Pimps with
a more dominant presence are better connected and benefit from an strong, efficient early warning
system. The unbalanced power distribution incentivizes less powerful pimps to pool and share
information on police deployment.
13
It is worth mentioning that this unbalanced power distribution among pimps and their subsequent
choice engage in truthful signaling and cooperation is due to the fact that gang wars4 are extremely
costly in Singapore. Gang wars result in the loss of profits and a negative shock in demand. More
importantly, Singapore has very low tolerance for crimes in the public domain. Gang wars will
weaken a gang’s territory control, and even destroy the gang.
1.4.2 Business Model
Legal status gives legal brothels a competitive edge, but it also prevents them from further ex-
ploiting demand. Legal brothels are less constrained to publicly advertise their business. While
some of the brothels feature Thai prostitutes and use fish tank displays on the brothel windows to
attract customers, others feature only Chinese women. These strategies target different demands
from customers: some Chinese-speaking customers enjoys chit- chat with Chinese women, while
others look for more obedient and gentle women (Thai sex workers). Since sex workers from legal
brothels are subject to regular health checks, brothels have earned the reputation for a safer and
cleaner sexual experience. Nevertheless, their legal status also sets restrictions on legal brothels.
They are prohibited from public soliciting, and all the trades can only be conducted in the brothel.
This leaves much unmet demand in the market. Street prostitution unbound by these restrictions
fills these gaps. Clients can buy from street sex workers and request the trade to take place in their
apartment. They can also buy the whole day’s time of street sex workers. In this sense, street
prostitution enjoys more freedom in operation without restriction by law. Another example of the
flexibility of the street segment is revealed in its service design. It sells the service through trans-
actions, whereas legal brothels adopt a fast-food model by pricing services by each 20 minutes or
45 minutes.
4Struggles are pervasive in underground economies and gang wars are a common means to resolve the disputes.
Levitt and Venkatesh [2000] provide evidence for this in their drug gang studies.
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1.4.3 Contracts
The most interesting difference observed between legal brothels and the street segment is the con-
tracts. The special characteristics of contracts are mostly due to the segment’s legality. In this
market, contracts are tools to formalize the employment or partnership relationship and market or-
der. On one hand, there is a legal employment contract between sex workers and brothel owners.
On the other hand, there an implicit contract between pimps and prostitutes in the illegal prostitu-
tion market of Geylang.
The brothel owners and pimps are local Singaporean men. They possess substantial knowledge
about local markets and have connections with clients and police authorities. The brothel owners
and pimps have full control of their territory, brothels and lanes respectively. They can be viewed as
monopoly distributors of sexual services and monopoly buyers of sexual service providers within
their realms. Leveraging this intangible capacity and geographical dominance, they are able to
impose and reinforce a set of contracts that allow them to exploit rents from prostitutes.
In legal brothels, brothel owners and sex workers enter into a legally binding labor contract. Duties
and compensation are clearly reflected in the legal contract. Since public soliciting is not legal, the
brothel manager is responsible for bringing in the customers, and sex workers are responsible for
providing the service and creating returning customers. The price of sexual service is determined
by market forces and varies among individuals. Negotiation is common. Brothel mangers perform
the bargaining for the prostitutes. In addition, they are responsible for protecting sex workers from
abnormal customers and providing accommodation (the brothel rooms) for the sex workers. In re-
turn, sex workers agree to share half of each transaction’s proceeds with brothel owners. Typically,
the prostitutes will depart when the work permit expires (in 2 years) or contracting an STD. The
legality of the contracted working status results in a lower turnover rate in brothels compared to
other venues.
Due to the illegal nature of their relationship, contracts between pimps and prostitutes in Geylang
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are implicit, and typically are in the form of verbal agreements. Provisions of such contracts go
far beyond a labor contract and cover a broader aspect of prostitutes’ working and personal lives.
There are two contracts involved: the migration contract and the working contract.
The migration contract begins as early as the moment the prostitutes agree to travel to Singapore to
work. Pimps help with tourist visa applications and arrange the safest and most economical travel
mode for them to reach Singapore. When passing through customs, prostitutes often face inquiries
from customs officers regarding their cash possession, which is a method officials use to screen
out illegal visitors like prostitutes. Pimps are responsible for providing pocket money to prostitutes
to ensure a smooth customs experience and they bear all travel related expenses. In return, the
prostitute is mandated to provide the first 60 services for free. Assuming the average service price
is S$50, each sex worker in effect pays S$3000 5 (approximately a month’s income) in exchange
for a working opportunity in Singapore. The pimps will settle the payment to the coordinators, if
any.
The working contract describes each party’s responsibility and the profit allocation rules after pros-
titutes commence work in Singapore. At work, pimps use their monopoly power over their territory
to deter the market incumbents for prostitutes, hence preventing intensifying competition and en-
suring that prostitutes earn maximum profits. Similar to the brothel owners, pimps protect the
prostitute’s personal safety against violent clients and police surveillance. In exchange, pimps de-
mand a cut of the unit service price (normally about 30-40 percent) as compensation and $10 a day
for the accommodation and transport services they arrange.
The relationship between pimps or brothel managers and prostitutes resembles a partnership, rather
than an employment relationship. They are maximizing the same utility function, which is strictly
increasing with every unit of service sold at a constant rate and strictly decreasing in the probability
of police arrest. The effort each party exerts and the output of the production is observable to both
parties at no cost. The principal-agent problem is a not a concern in this case. Prostitutes may
5S$3000 is a conservative estimate of monthly income.
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have incentive to keep client’s tips as private information, but these tips are not substantial in
comparison with total revenue generated. The organization structure is fairly simple in Geylang. It
is different from the sophisticated and multilayer organization structure in the drug gang studied in
Levitt and Venkatesh [2000] where a rank-ordered compensation scheme rather than performance-
based scheme is employed. The compensation scheme for prostitutes is a piece-rate scheme. Their
income increases proportionally to the number of transactions sold.
The rent paid to pimps has a different economic interpretation in legal and illegal segments. Both
brothel managers and pimps incur high fixed costs to start the business. In pursuit of recovering
the fixed rental cost and other auxiliary costs like electricity, it is rational for the brothel owners
to demand profit sharing. However, I believe the 50-50 split of profit is not the most efficient
allocation. Legal prostitutes are tied to the employment contract with brothel and are circumscribed
from on-job searches. In absence of search rigidity, prostitutes’ bargaining power will be greatly
elevated and drive a more optimal profit split.
The case with pimps is more interesting. In the legal world, the government serves as the provider
of public goods and public safety and imposes taxes to finance the expenses. In this illegal context,
it is the pimps, not the government, who ensures security and enforces the market rules. The cut
of profit they request functions as a tax they impose on the prostitutes under their regime. Security
services are highly valued by prostitutes as they are fully exposed when soliciting on the street.
In this sense, security is a necessity for prostitutes and their demand for such service is inelastic.
Nevertheless, the 40/60 splitting rule can never be the most efficient allocation of profits. Should
there be competition among the pimps, a more optimal split, (lower rent extracted by pimps) will
prevail.
Looking at it from a different perspective, high profit sharing entails pimps being paid at an effi-
ciency wage. It is rather obvious that prostitutes’ consent to do so is not to prevent pimps’ shirking
[Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984], because they can well monitor the pimps’ efforts, and more impor-
tantly, pimps and prostitutes are maximizing the almost identical profit function. Agreeing to pay
17
an efficiency wage is a strategic action prostitutes take to minimize labor turnover or the exit of
pimps [Yellen, 1984]. Pimps are scarce commodities in the market. The switching cost or replace-
ment cost of pimps is extremely high for prostitutes. As aforementioned, prostitutes without pimps
face enormous challenges in this market. They cannot afford to lose the protection of pimp. More-
over, since their network is a star network that is centered around pimp, they have limited channels
to engage with other pimps, which make it very expense for them to find the substitutes. Also,
prostitutes have strong financial ties with pimps. Sometimes, prostitutes allow pimps to keep their
savings, in order to prevent the loss of their money in the event of arrest. A committed pimp will
help to remit the money back to the prostitute’s home country. If pimps found that the operation
is not more profitable than other options, they may withdraw and take the prostitutes’ savings with
them.
Despite the fact that the contracts on the street are informal, unilateral breach of contract on the
prostitutes’ side rarely happens because the penalty of breaching the contract is infinitely high.
They may face earnings deprivation, physical abuse and even their own lives. Therefore, the im-
plicit contracts on the street could be even more binding than the legal contracts in the brothels.
Both legal and illegal contracts are not optimal contracts, but they function as stable equilibrium
contracts.
1.5 Street Prostitution v.s Orchard Tower Bar Prostitution
Prostitution on the street and in Orchard Tower are both illegal. However, they function very
differently and yield different market outcomes. Despite the fact that these segments target different
demands, most of these distinct differences are results of network structures which are ultimately
determined by the distribution of power among pimps.
Geylang Street
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Recall that Geylang Street is controlled by the pimps and such power distribution is not uniform
with a few pimps displaying dominant power and the rest displaying smaller but equal powers.
The pimp’s power grants him autocracy in the lane of his control. Sex workers produce under his
management and receive protection from him against adversities. A fully centralized star network
is formed under the power of a pimp. Even though pimps and sex workers work like partners to
produce the output, sex workers have very low or no autonomy. Looking at it from a macro view,
it is more like a society with a dictator and subordinates where the subordinates pay a high tax
under this nondemocratic regime. On the other hand, there are also networks among the pimps.
Pimps can maintain dictatorships within their own realms because they can access information and
resources, some of which are attained from the networks with other pimps, as shown by the police
raid warnings as mentioned earlier.
The formation of this network commences as pimps start to recruit. They act as a migration agency
by selecting and sending the sex workers into Singapore from other countries. This kind of help and
facilitation is rare for women who are interested in this adventure and the presence of asymmetric
information is strong. As the monopoly seller, pimps are able to negotiate contracts with sex
workers that are disadvantageous to the sex workers from the very the outset. A stark example is
that sex workers need to provide first 60 services for free in exchange for this working opportunity
and pay a high tax in terms of sharing 30%-40% of their income with the pimp.
However, sex workers have a strong incentive to join and remain in this network. Networks create
a substantial surplus by facilitating information transmission, minimizing the risk of arrest and en-
hancing competitiveness, which are key elements that help sex workers to survive in this market.
Sex workers use the pimp’s monopoly power to stay competitive, because pimp deter the unde-
sired entry of newcomers. Unaffiliated sex workers are not allowed to solicit without the pimp’s
permission. Pimps are also able to provide early warning about police raids to sex workers, which
greatly reduces their chances of exiting the market because of arrest. Prostitutes also maintain
steeper learning curves on market dynamics and customers’ preferences through the network, and
they enjoy the economy of scale by sharing lodging with other sex workers under the pimp.
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Pimps extract the rent as an intermediary who has access to the network. But why do sex workers
not pose a threat of revolution to the pimp and form their own democratic society to achieve a
redistribution of surplus? As shown in Acemoglu and Robinson [2001], a revolution may break
out in a non-democratic society if the cost of revolution is low and the inequality is high. The
fundamental reason for the persistence of this non-democratic regime is sex workers cannot afford
the cost of revolution given the power presence of pimps. There is no room for sex workers to
live in this market without a pimp because the entire street segment is controlled by them. Strikes
would not only expose them to life-threating danger from the pimps but would also reveal their
identities to police authorities. Moreover, sex workers in each network have no or little connection
to the other networks on the street, which leaves them in a weak bargaining position if they threaten
to leave the network. Even though the sex worker could find a network to switch to, she probably
would not be better off. Due to the competition among the pimps, the profit-sharing rule is mostly
similar across the networks.
Therefore, the presence of the pimp’s power has shaped the network structures and profit allocation
rules as well as the labor market outcomes in the street segment. It is obvious that there is very low
labor mobility across the network, and almost no labor movement across the segments.
Orchard Tower Bar
In contrast, without the presence of mafia power, different network dynamics are observed in the
Orchard Tower Bars. Various networks are formed among the sex workers from different countries
in Orchard Tower. Democratic networks have emerged as dominating networks and there is a weak
presence of nondemocratic networks. However, it is in a relatively unstable state. There is a cycle
of formation and disintegration of the democratic networks with transitions between democratic
and nondemocratic networks.
Orchard Tower is filled with bars and clubs and a few of the clubs are the sites of prostitution
activities. The prostitution activities occur only on the 2nd and 3rd floors of the building. All these
establishments are managed by legal business entities and their main income stems from bar sales.
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They welcome sex workers to solicit in their bars because sex workers pay rent in order to sell their
services and they encourage customers to spend money on drinks. Other than this, sex workers are
independent of the bars6.
In the absence of monopolistic control of territory in the Orchard Tower, the prostitutes’ need for
an intermediary like a pimp or a manager is diminished. However, they still face a big threat
from police authorities and other market entrants. They rationally deal with these challenges by
forming their own network which helps facilitate the transmission of alerts on police monitoring
and increases their chance of survival in the market7. Networks are typically formed by sex workers
from the same country. Two dominating networks in Orchard Tower are formed by Thai and
Vietnamese prostitutes. This alliance raises the entry barrier for prostitutes from other countries,
as well as enhances their competitiveness in the market. An incumbent with no membership in
the network will have a very hard time soliciting on the floors with connected prostitutes. Verbal
or even physical threats are deployed by network members to drive the incumbent out of venue.
Lacking the benefit of the early warning, incumbents are the most susceptible to police patrol.
Democratic “cycle” network permits prostitutes to enjoy an increased share of payoff by allowing
them to retain their entire earnings8. The larger the network, the more accurate and timely will be
the information collected. The value of the network further appreciated when network members
succeed in evading police monitoring, securing business opportunities and colluding in price set-
ting. The change of network size entails a trade-off between the benefits of increased accessibility
of information and the costs of sharing the information. Because the networks are formed volun-
tarily, which means that sex workers are also free to leave the network at their will, there is a higher
labor mobility in Orchard Tower than in Geylang.
Not everyone has equal power within in such networks. When there is a conflict with another
6The ones who are not able to afford the rent are left to solicit on the street outside of Orchard Tower. This group of
street prostitutes sells services at lower prices, which reflects the downward shifted demand curve they face.
7Such alert systems work well because most of Orchard Tower prostitutes solicit within the bars, which permits
them enough time to escape, avoiding the police inspection. Orchard Tower is a relatively smaller market compared to
Geylang.
8Except that they need to pay the small admission fee to the bars instead of the pimps.
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network, someone must lead the network in order to effectively tackle the conflict. Hence, the
democratic network is in effect controlled by elite members. Because there is limited means for
elite members to consolidate the democracy, other elites may come up and compete for power in
rough times. Therefore, there is a continuation of the birth and death of democratic networks.
These democratic networks are often pervasive in the two biggest bars I mentioned earlier. In
other smaller bars or nearby hotel lounges, less democratic networks are also seen. These networks
function like similarly to the dictator networks on the street, with some key differences. In these
smaller venues, female managers are present. These female managers maintain control over the
small venue typically because they are the mistresses of bar owners. In this sense, they gain power
like pimps because they depend on the bar owner’s power. This happens often in the high-end
lounges. The members in the network are required to share profits when soliciting in that venue.
This nondemocratic network is rather unstable, because power shifts when another elite sex worker
rises to become the mistress of the bar owner. It seems that the person who is really in power is the
bar owner and these female managers are just their agents.
In a nutshell, the distribution of power presence of pimps is crucial in determining the network
framework in this market. Nondemocratic networks are likely to prevail when there is the presence
of pimp power and democratic networks are likely to persist when there is no role for pimps.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I comprehensively review the institution of the commercial sex market in Singapore,
and I closely compare and contrast these seemingly similar but different market segments (street
prostitution vs. legal brothels on Geylang Street, street vs. Orchard Tower bars in the illegal mar-
ket). I find that prostitution law governing the market and the power distribution of the pimps
interplays with each other and determines the different institutions in each segment. These institu-
tions include the business model, information sharing, network structure, and contracting. These
22
factors advance our understanding about the observed differences in profit sharing rules and labor
mobility across the segments.
After this discussion, it should no longer be surprising to observe the coexistence of the legal and
illegal segments in this market. Legal brothels can operate in the way described above precisely
because of their legal legitimacy. Such a model is not replicable in the illegal segments. The
illegal nature of the activities creates negative transitory shocks to the business. However, free of
the restriction of prostitution law, illegal sectors also enjoy more flexibility, which is how they can
complement the legal sector and prosper alongside the legal sector. Street sectors offer more variety
of supply and more flexible working hours and service design. Orchard Tower bars and nightclubs
fulfill the demand for higher-end services, including more entertainment and tailored services.
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Table 1.1: General Composition of Supply and Demand in Singapore
Venue
Street OrchardT Bars Nightclub Total
No. Sales No. Sales No. Sales No. Sales
Country
China 59 295 6 24 24 101 89 420
Thailand 58 265 24 107 30 167 112 539
Vietnam 38 142 40 152 5 22 82 316
Indonesia 16 83 1 3 5 23 22 109
SgpIndian 6 29 1 6 14 74 21 109
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 20 101 20 101
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 28 147 28 147
Philippines 0 0 3 13 20 116 23 129
CambodiaMyanmar 0 0 3 9 0 0 3 9
Romania 0 0 6 29 1 6 7 35
Greece 0 0 2 10 0 0 2 10
Mongolia 0 0 2 8 0 0 2 8
Total 176 88 147 411
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Ethnicity
Chinese 295 36.4 157 43.5 308 40.7 760 39.4
JapaneseKorean 55 6.8 24 6.6 82 10.8 161 8.4
Caucasian 106 13.1 111 30.7 202 26.7 419 21.7
Middle Eastern 36 4.4 16 4.4 74 9.8 126 6.5
Indian 86 10.6 31 8.6 55 7.3 172 8.9
Malay 60 7.4 2 0.6 23 3.0 85 4.4
Bangladeshi 167 20.6 1 0.3 1 0.1 169 8.8
Black(American) 6 0.7 19 5.3 11 1.5 36 1.9
Total 814 100.0 361 100.0 757 100.0 1932 100.0
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Table 1.2: Sex Worker Characteristics (1/2)
Venue
Street OrchardT Bars Nightclub Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Education
Illiterate 175 21.5 23 6.4 67 8.9 265 13.7
Primary 442 54.3 97 27.1 405 53.5 944 48.9
Secondary 149 18.3 107 29.9 196 25.9 452 23.4
High School 35 4.3 84 23.5 86 11.4 205 10.6
Advanced Diploma 0 0.0 17 4.7 0 0.0 17 0.9
College 13 1.6 30 8.4 3 0.4 46 2.4
MaritalS
Single/Relationship 571 69.9 290 81.0 687 90.8 1548 80.1
Married 83 10.2 16 4.5 19 2.5 118 6.1
Divorced 152 18.6 52 14.5 46 6.1 250 12.9
Widow 11 1.3 0 0.0 5 0.7 16 0.8
Urban
Rural 547 67.7 101 28.2 566 78.7 1214 64.4
Urban 261 32.3 257 71.8 153 21.3 671 35.6
Child
No 644 78.9 310 86.6 697 92.3 1651 85.6
Yes 172 21.1 48 13.4 58 7.7 278 14.4
Total 817 100.0 358 100.0 757 100.0 1932 100.0
* Initial Price proposed by the sex workers
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Table 1.3: Sex Worker Characteristics (2/2)
Venue
Street OrchardT Bars Nightclub
Mean Std.
Err.
Mean Std.
Err.
Mean Std.
Err.
Age 26.35 3.91 27.34 4.45 24.00 3.184
Working Days a Week 6.36 1.14 6.31 0.77 5.70 1.19
Workhours (Weekday) 9.14 2.16 5.50 1.43 4.76 16.28
Workhours (Weekend) 11.38 3.26 7.02 2.05 8.23 1.71
Clients per day 3.87 1.68 1.86 0.97 2.70 1.10
Years of Experience 2.92 1.92 3.09 2.10 3.12 1.71
Years of Experience (Singapore) 1.69 1.31 1.59 1.33 2.27 1.46
Income in Singapore (S$) 3202 1220 3396 1311 3104 1267
Income at Home (S$) 450 344 357 437 581 559
Price of Service 69.26 32.56 200.84 67.84 229.15 100.30
Chapter 2
Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination?
2.1 Introduction
The canonical discrimination model in economics, Becker [1957], predicts discrimination cannot
survive in a competitive equilibrium. In contrast, Diamond [1971] implies the opposite: discrimi-
nation can prevail in a competitive equilibrium even when the search cost is small. In this paper, I
test these two competing theories in the highly competitive sex market of Singapore and find that
discrimination persists. Moreover, sex workers engage in both statistical and taste-based discrim-
ination, with the former being the most dominant force. They discriminate based on the client’s
willingness to pay by using ethnicity as an indicator. They also practice taste-based discrimination
against ethnic groups with darker skin tones and odor.
A significant amount of literature in economics is devoted to the investigation of race, gender and
age discrimination in the labor, consumer and housing markets. In his pioneering work, Becker
argues that discrimination cannot survive in a competitive equilibrium because competitive forces
will drive prejudiced participants out of market1. Applied to my setting, sex workers who discrim-
inate would lose out to other sex workers who are willing to sell their services at a lower price.
In contrast, Black [1995] analyzes equilibrium discrimination using a random search model where
search is costly. My setting is similar except that I study the consumers’ search for a service rather
1Contradicting Becker, Graddy [1995] finds price discrimination in favor of Asians and against Whites in a highly
competitive market, the Fulton Fish Market in New York, and suggests that the different conduct of competition in Asian
and White markets could be the cause of discrimination.
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than the workers’ search for a job. Diamond [1971] formally shows that monopoly pricing (i.e.
discrimination) must persist in an otherwise competitive market when firms sell a homogeneous
service and customers search sequentially, even when the search cost is infinitesimal. Applied to
my setting, this implies that sex workers are able to discriminate against customers as long as the
customers incur a search cost.
There are very few market settings available to economists to directly test the applicability of these
theories. Much of the research relies on audit or correspondent studies (Ayres and Siegelman,
1995; Neumark, 1996; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), field studies (List, 2004; Castillo, Petrie,
Torero, and Vesterlund, 2013 ) and regression studies (Goldberg, 1996). However, as Heckman
and Siegelman [1993] argues, the audit and correspondent studies often lack identical comparison
groups. Even when the comparison group is identically constructed, it still faces the threat of
variations in unobservables. They address discriminative behavior but not whether this behavior
affects the equilibrium. Regression studies, however, inevitably suffer from missing variables and
are less helpful in identifying the source of discrimination. Field experiments also have pros and
cons. They do enable researchers to control the environment, and hence, can be designed to test
theories and to distinguish the nature of discrimination. List [2004] uses the natural setting of the
sportscard trading platform and uses real market participants to identify the existence and nature
of discrimination. But, when it comes to field experiments, there is the risk that the experimenter
influences the interactions and thus biases the results.
In this paper, I examine equilibrium discrimination in a unique real market setting: the commercial
sex market in Singapore. It is an ideal setting due to the presence of a large number of nearly
identical sex workers selling homogeneous services to clients who search at negligible cost, thus
forming a highly competitive market.2 My study specifically explores the sex workers’ discrim-
ination against clients of different ethnicities. I use unique data on both the sex workers and on
their transactions. I do not interfere with market operations, but only record information obtained
from sex workers regarding their most recent transactions. This method ensures that the data fully
2 See more discussion on competition in Geylang in Section 2.2.4.
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reflects the market dynamics.
This study also contributes by distinguishing the sources of discrimination. During the interviews,
the sex workers revealed that they price services differently based on the client’s ethnicity, which
they take as a signal of the client’s willingness to pay. They tend to actively approach Caucasians,
Japanese, and Koreans, which are the ethnic groups whom they believe to be wealthier. Thus,
the sex workers inflate the prices quoted to these clients. On the other hand, sex workers express
animus towards ethnic client groups who have darker skin tones and who are perceived to be more
sexually violent (such as Indians). They report that they avoid these clients or ask for higher
prices to compensate for the disutility from working with them. The former hints at statistical
discrimination (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972) while the latter suggests taste-based discrimination.
Since the sex workers’ discriminating preferences influence their behavior and pricing strategy, I
build a hybrid discrimination model explaining: 1. Sex workers’ inclination to actively approach
clients; 2. How sex workers use observable wealth signals and incorporate their taste preferences
in setting the service price; 3. How the bargaining outcomes will differ depending on the sex
workers’ behavior in step 1 and step 2. The model’s predictions allow me to identify the source
of discrimination. Empirically, I perform fixed effects regressions, together with logit fixed effects
and probit regressions (in some incidences), to study the likelihood of the sex workers approaching
a client before he approaches them, determinants of the sex workers’ initial price, and the likelihood
that the bargaining fails in accordance with the theory model.
The outline of the remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 offers a compre-
hensive institutional review on the commercial sex industry in Singapore. I describe the theoretical
model in Section 2.3, followed by a description of survey and data in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
presents the identification strategy and, key empirical results are thoroughly discussed in Section
2.6. Lastly, I conclude in Section 2.7.
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2.2 Commercial Sex Industry in Singapore
Prostitution in Singapore dates back to the 1800s when Singapore was a British colony [Warren,
1993]. Even though Singapore strives to build a safe and clean city-state, the police still unofficially
tolerate and monitor rampant prostitution activities 3. In the late 1990s, the authorities issued
special licenses for the operation of “legal” brothels. Only ex-offenders are qualified to apply for
such licenses 4. The issuance of licenses ceased around 2000 and left over 100 licensed brothels
running in the red light district, Geylang. The legality of prostitution is not fully recognized by the
law in Singapore. According to Human Rights Report: Singapore by U.S. Bureau of Democracy
Human Right and Labor, prostitution-related activities (soliciting, operating a brothel, pimping)
are not legal and anti-vice police deploy weekly raids to signal their authority. While licensed
brothels are exempt from police raids, they are restrained from publicly soliciting for customers.
Sex workers from regulated brothels are also subject to regular medical check-ups5.
The largest portion of the commercial sex industry consists of illegal brothels and illegal sex work-
ers who come mainly from China, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines [Agency France Press].
The business follows a seasonal trend with peak months in June, September and December follow-
ing Singapore’s tourism industry. Business is slowest during the Chinese New Year period when
both supply and demand are low. This study presents several prominent features of the commercial
sex industry in Singapore. First, the supply of sex workers is highly diversified in terms of country
of origin, while domestic supply is low. Concurrently, the demand for prostitution is also diver-
sified in the sense that clients are of different ethnic backgrounds. Second, the legal and illegal
segments coexist within the flourishing underground market. Third, the illegal market consists of
low-, middle-, and high-end market segments featuring sex workers of varying quality and targeting
different segments of demand.
2Unless otherwise cited, all the descriptions presented in this section are based on the interviews with the sex work-
ers,the pimps, and workers in this sector (i.e. bartenders).
3Source: U.S. Bureau of Democracy Human Right and Labor
4This license is not a license for prostitution per se, but a special business license which allows brothel owners to
operate the brothel under police authority
5See a comprehensive institutional review on the entire commercial sex industry in Singapore in my institution paper
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2.2.1 Low Domestic Supply & High Foreign Supply
Singapore has one of the best educated populations in the world. 95 percent of its female population
are literate and 63 percent of female residents have secondary or higher educational qualifications
[Ministry of Statistics, Singapore]. Therefore, there is less incentive for a local female to be a sex
worker. Moreover, being a prostitute in the small conservative island is threatening to a woman’s
reputation. Thus, the Singaporean sex industry is populated by sex workers from poor neighboring
countries who travel to Singapore to sell their bodies after being attracted by the high returns. The
high returns appear even more attractive due to the high income differential between Singapore and
poorer neighboring countries. Furthermore, working as a sex worker away from home mitigates
the risk of being judged by one’s own society. For these reasons, girls from poorer neighboring
countries are willing to accept the high risks that come with being a sex worker, although it is also
possible that they are not fully aware of the risks in the first place. However, it is worth noting that
not all of these sex workers work permanently in Singapore. Most of them are on short-term visitor
passes. They visit Singapore from time to time not only to seek lucrative earning opportunities
but to pursue marriage opportunities with Singaporean men and Western males. The low domestic
supply and high foreign supply is consistent with Edlund and Korn [2002] who predict that the
number of the domestic sex workers will decrease as domestic income rises.
2.2.2 Diversified Composition of Demand
The demand for prostitution stems from both locals6 and expatriates of different ethnic back-
grounds. Over the years, female undergraduates in Singapore have outperformed males in many
professions. The existence of 300,000 white-collar male workers in Singapore who cannot find
wives made headlines around 2005. Few women are willing to marry men below their education
and economic status. At the same time, Singapore has a large population of expatriates. One third
6Almost half of the sex clients come from Indonesia’s Riau region, an island kilometers away from Singapore
[Williams, Lyons, and Ford, 2012].
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of the workforce in Singapore is made up of foreign workers, approximately 1.2 million people
[Ministry of Manpower, Singapore]. 10 percent of foreign workers belong to the PMET (Profes-
sional, Managers, Executives and Technicians), while the remaining 707 percent are low- and semi-
skilled non-PMET workers. The majority of the non-PMET workers who are in the construction
and manufacturing sectors are men. Bangladeshi construction workers in particular are frequent
visitors to the Geylang red light district, representing a sizable demand for affordable sexual ser-
vices. In addition, Singapore is a popular tourist hub. In 2011, it attracted 13.2 million tourists
and generated S$22.3 billion in tourist receipts [Singapore Tourism Board]. It is fairly common
for tourists to visit an international destination in order to seek sexual services. According to the
US ambassador Harry Thomas, 40 percent of male visits to the Philippines are for sex [Australia
News Report]. Thus, the influx of male tourists, to a certain extent, creates a stream of demand for
prostitution in Singapore as well.
2.2.3 Illegal Market Segments
Besides the legal brothels in Geylang, there are three main segments in the illegal market. When
defining the segments by the quality and price of the service, we can categorize the best-known red
light areas Geylang (even-numbered lanes) as the low-end segment, the renowned Orchard Tower
Bars as the mid-tier segment and the nightclubs as the high-end segment of the market. The sex
workers in Geylang and Orchard Tower Bars are mostly freelancers operating with tourist passes.
Many of the Geylang streetwalkers are associated with pimps who are backed by gangs. They are
full-time sex workers with no other source of income. In contrast, many women working in the
nightclubs are hired by the clubs as artistic performers (i.e dancers, singers and hostesses) under
a legal work permit. They make money as sex workers on a part-time basis. Sex workers solicit
only within their own segments. For example, a Chinese street sex worker in Geylang will not
solicit in Orchard Towers. The Thai and Vietnamese girls who solicit in the bars inside of Orchard
Towers will not go over to Geylang for business either. This is because they fall into the different
7The statistics are calculated excluding foreign domestic workers. (Ministry of Manpower, Singapore)
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segments based on their own characteristics and networks. Trespassing across the segments may
risk their safety and earnings. Sexual services typically take place in venues like motels and hotels,
as well as in cars or the client’s residence. A full-time sex worker will return to her original venue
immediately after finishing with a client. Any costs, such as taxi fare and hotel room charges are
usually borne by clients.
Other, more scattered forms of illegal prostitution typically operate as KTVs8, massage parlors and
social escort. KTVs are entertainment pubs where clients can book rooms to sing songs with friends
and be entertained by friends or by the hostess. Prostitutes in the KTVs are managed by the KTV
manager, and therefore have less freedom to decide work hours, prices and which customers to
take. The owner of a KTV is subject to a jail sentence if he or she is caught running a prostitution
business. Massage parlors are also popular places to seek sexual services. Massage girls offer
massage service followed by sexual service for a “tip” Massage girls enjoy the benefit of an “early-
warning” system9, where a warning will be given to the parties involved when the police are on
their way, so that they can dress before the police arrive. There are hundreds of massage parlors
throughout the city with entrance fees ranging from 28 to 80 dollars. Most of them are licensed
business premises with a Public Entertainment license. Also, there are other social escorts who
advertise their services on the Internet and on flyers. Some social escorts can be very expensive.
Together, sex workers from these venues represent a relatively small portion of the total sex worker
population in Singapore.
2.2.4 Geylang Street
Competition
This paper focuses solely on the low-end market (Geylang). Geylang stands alone as the largest
market in Singapore’s commercial sex industry, as its size and popularity make it a top destination
8KTV refers Karaoke television, a form of interactive musical entertainment establishment where clients and enter-
tainers can sing and drink and mingle. With few exceptions, the many of KTV host prostitution or related activities.
9Cited from www.sammyboy.com
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for prostitution. The services found venues like Orchard Tower Bars and nightclubs are not per-
fect substitutes for those found in Geylang, because services offered in the higher-end venues are
more diversified and target wealthy individuals. The Geylang market is highly competitive. Pros-
titution activities are concentrated in a small zone of 25 lanes. Within it, large numbers of nearly
homogeneous prostitutes publicly solicit on the streets and sell similar services. Differences in sex
workers’ characteristics may make one more desirable than the other. Nevertheless, they are nearly
perfect substitutes in the clients’ eyes10. On the other hand, clients bear a negligible search cost
in the red light district. First, there is zero risk of being penalized for patronizing the prostitutes.
Second, there is minimal social cost in terms of reputation loss by walking in the red light district,
because Geylang is a popular tourist and dining destination. Most importantly, clients are able to
easily locate a match within 2-5 minutes due to the high density of prostitutes on the street.
Composition and Background
Chinese and Vietnamese sex workers dominate the scene and are patronized by mostly Singaporean
men, Caucasian men and Bangladeshi construction workers. As a place for cheap sexual services,
it is a favorite destination for construction workers and other less wealthy clients. The plentiful
supply of Chinese women also makes Geylang the preferred choice for Chinese clients who desire
a “girlfriend” kind of experience with the sex worker. It is also a particularly attractive venue
for elderly single men who desire companionship. Sex workers in Geylang start work late in the
afternoon or early evening and finish work in the morning. Because the initial engagement of the
prostitutes and clients takes place on the public street, flirting and negotiation time are relatively
short in this segment of the market, as both parties prefer to maintain minimum public exposure.
All the sex workers solicit within the areas of even-numbered lorong (lanes) between lane 1 and
lane 30. There is little differentiation in the services offered and the large number of the suppliers
make this micro-market close to a perfectly competitive market. The service rate is set to float
around S$30-S$200 with a median price of $60 and standard deviation of $35. Freelance street sex
10Levitt and Dubner [2010] makes this claim in SuperFreakeconomics. Our interviews with the clients reveal the
same fact.
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workers solicit independently but are collectively overseen by pimps, depending on the areas of
their business. Each lorong (lane) is controlled by a pimp who oversees the business (protects the
women from abnormal clients), provides the girls’ accommodation, and protects them from being
arrested in the event of police raids. In return, they ask for a cut of the unit service price (normally
about 30 -40 percent) as compensation and $10 a day for accommodation and transport services.
Tourist visas enable sex workers to re-enter Singapore frequently. Many of them travel to Singapore
by land or sea. When a sex worker is transported from her country to Singapore, she usually does
not need to make any initial monetary investment. All the related costs are borne by the parties
who manage her trip and work. In return, she is mandated to provide the first 60 services for
free and share the profit with a pimp for each additional service. Assuming the average service
price is S$50, each sex worker in effect pays S$3000 in exchange for a working opportunity in
Singapore. The actual transportation cost is fairly low as they are escorted by the cheapest mode of
transport. The majority of the profits are shared by the managers at both ends and the middlemen.
The coordinators need to provide sufficient pocket money for the sex workers in order for them to
pass through customs safely. The pocket money is meant to help the sex workers show the custom
officers that they are financially able to stay in Singapore.
2.3 Theory Model
In this section, I aim to capture both the effect of the sex workers’ statistical discrimination and
taste-based discrimination with a simple model. I assume sex workers discriminate by selectively
choosing the clients to approach and by adjusting their prices. They maximize utility by making
these two decisions simultaneously before taking any action. The clients make the decision to
accept or reject the offer after receiving the initial price.
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2.3.1 Hybrid Discrimination Model
In this market, both the sex worker and the potential client simultaneously search for a match. The
client’s true willingness to pay is private information. The sex worker relies on the potential client’s
observable characteristics (i.e. ethnicity, outfit, attractiveness) to infer his ability to pay. The sex
worker decides whether to approach him after observing these characteristics. After approaching
the potential client, the sex worker proposes an initial price. The potential client can either accept
or reject it. If the man takes the offer, there is a deal. If the man refuses the offer, both the sex
worker and the man return to their sequential search.
2.3.1.1 Model Setup
The sex worker wants to maximize the surplus from sales. Since the sex worker’s technology is
linear, she aims to maximize the surplus function from each transaction. The expected surplus
function is expressed in this equation (2.1).
E (Surplus) = [1 − F (P, S)] (P − C) − d (2.1)
A sex worker decides to approach a client only if her expected surplus from the sale is greater than
her reservation expected profit. If approached, she sells the service at a price of P with the cost of
C, and she will obtain the proceeds only if the client accepts her offer.
Sex Worker’s Behavior
When a sex worker sees a potential client, she does not observe the potential client’s private infor-
mation regarding his willingness to pay, but she does receive a signal. Since other wealth-revealing
signals are noisy, the sex worker uses the client’s ethnicity (S) as the main signal to infer his will-
ingness to pay. Signal S for each ethnicity falls into a bounded interval and clients with the same
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ethnicity but different characteristics (i.e. outfit and attractiveness) take different values of S in that
interval. These intervals are disjoint and S (namely the intervals) is assumed to be increasing in the
client’s willingness to pay. Signal S allows us to detect the sex worker’s discrimination resulting
from rational calculation given market friction. The interval range of S for each ethnicity ensures
that different types of clients with the same ethnicity will be approached with different probabilities
by any given sex worker.
Let θ be the distaste indicator and θ = {A, B} , where A is the non-discriminated group and B
is the discriminated group. The field interviews suggest sex workers find Indian clients distasteful
because they are perceived to have a darker skin tone and off-putting body odor among other
reasons. Therefore, θ is also a function of the client’s ethnicity. Nevertheless, S and θ are different
characterizations of ethnicity.
Let us denote d to be the sex worker’s reservation expected profit. She will approach the client only
if her expected surplus from the sale exceeds d. The value of d depends on the opportunity cost of
waiting and the arrival rate of clients. We assume the opportunity cost of waiting is fixed for each
sex worker and the arrival rate of the client follows a Poisson distribution. The client’s arrival rate
is higher over the weekend than during the weekdays, hence we expect a higher reservation price
for the weekend.
It is costly for sex workers to provide the service. Such cost C is higher for the disliked client group
(CA < CB). C is the sex worker’s reservation price once she approaches the potential client, while
d is the sunk cost of the approach.
Client’s Behavior
After learning the asking price, the client rejects or accepts the offer with the rejection probability
F (P ;S). For simplicity, we write the rejection function as F (P − S). S is assumed to be given
and fixed for each client, and it is normalized so that F (P − S) is decreasing in S. S acts as a
shift parameter which shifts the distribution of (P − S) and in turn influences the distribution of
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the rejection probability with respect to each type of S. F (P − S) has density function f(P − S).
F (P − S) is assumed to be strictly log concave. The strict log concavity of F (·) ensures it is
increasing in P and its inverse hazard function m (P − S), m (P − S) = (1−F (P−S))f(P−S) , is strictly
decreasing in P (m′(P − S) < 0).
Sex Worker’s Optimal Strategy
Pricing
The sex worker chooses P to maximize the surplus function in equation (2.1). The first-order
condition is
P ∗ = (1 − F (P
∗ − S))
f(P ∗ − S) + C = m(P
∗ − S) + C (2.2)
Using the implicit function theorem, since m(·) is strictly decreasing in P , we have
0 < ∂P
∗
∂C
= 11 − m′(P ∗ − S) < 1 (2.3)
and
0 < ∂P
∗
∂S
= −m
′(P − S)
1 − m′(P − S) < 1 (2.4)
Therefore, the equilibrium price offer P ∗ is strictly increasing in the cost of providing the service
and in wealthy signal S, but with a smaller magnitude.
Approaching Decision
A sex worker will approach the potential client as long as her expected surplus is positive.
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Pr (approach| S, θ) = Pr ([1 − F (Ps − S)] (Ps − Cθ) − d ≥ 0) (2.5)
∂Pr(approach| S,θ)
∂C = F (P − S) − 1 ≤ 0 (2.6)
Equation (2.6) implies that a sex worker is less likely to approach a client whom she views as more
costly.
In addition, ∂F (P−S)∂S = f(P − S)(∂P∂S − 1) and
∂Pr(approach| S,θ)
∂S = −(P − C)
∂F (P − S)
∂S
+ (1 − F (P − S))∂P
∂S
(2.7)
Using equation (2.4), we are able conclude
∂Pr(approach| S,θ)
∂S > 0 (2.8)
Equation (2.8) implies that a sex worker is more likely to approach a client whom she views as
more wealthy.
2.3.2 Empirical Predictions
Step 1. Decision to Approach
For any given price P and signal S, an increase in the cost of providing service C will decrease
a sex worker’s expected surplus, hence resulting in a lower likelihood of approaching the client
group B in comparison with the non-discriminated group A.
For any given offer price P and cost C, the sex worker expects a higher surplus from the clients
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with a higher wealth indicator S, and therefore are more likely to approach the clients who have a
higher S than the ones with a lower S.
Step 2. Price Setting
Condition on sex worker’s approaching, it is only optimal for a prejudiced sex worker to sell the
service to the discriminated potential clients B at a higher price, as she incurs a higher cost by
working for disliked clients. This indicates the sex worker’s taste discrimination.
Condition on sex worker’s approaching, sex worker observes a higher signal of wealth S, she
believes the client has a higher willingness to pay, and hence will suggest a higher price to maximize
her surplus. It reveals the sex worker’s statistical discrimination.
Step 3 Client’s reaction to the price offer
Condition on the sex worker’s approaching, the discriminated group will be asked to pay a premium
on the initial price. Since F (P − S) is an increasing function of P , it follows trivially that the
discriminated client’s rejection rate is higher than the non-discriminated group, for a fixed S.
For a fixed C, the clients with a higher wealth signal will be less likely to reject the offer compared
to the clients with lower wealth signals.
Step 4. Discount on the Initial Price Offer
This model does not allow for bargaining and hence offers no conclusive prediction on discounts.
The realized discounts could be collectively determined by the bargaining skills of both the sex
worker and the client as well as the bargaining time, together with price P and rejection rate
F (·). Assuming that both parties have equal bargaining skills and equal bargaining time, we can
establish the following intuitive discussions on the outcome of the discount with respect to clients
with different S and θ. A sex worker extracts more surplus from the client with higher S as she
would place a higher P on them. She is still able to earn more proceeds from the high S client even
if she grants a higher discount to them in comparison to the low S client. Therefore, we expect the
40
client with higher S to receive a higher discount than the client with lower S. Moreover, I expect
the sex worker to give a smaller cut of the initial price to the disliked client group compared to the
not-disliked group. This is because she wants to avoid contact with the disliked group and has less
incentive to sell services to them. In short, there will be a larger contract curve for clients with high
S and clients with low C, which suggests more opportunity to negotiate a reduction in price.
2.3.3 Partial Equilibrium
For any given pair of {S, θ}, the partial equilibrium is characterized by following conditions:
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Approaching probability : Pr ([1 − F (P ∗ − S)] (P ∗ − Cθ) ≥ d∗)
Equilibirum Price : P ∗ = (1−F (P
∗−S))
f(P ∗−S) + Cθ
2.4 Survey and Data
2.4.1 Survey Design and Data Collection
2.4.1.1 Before Collection
Survey Design
The survey is comprised of two parts. Part I is designed to collect individual information about
the sex workers and Part II is designed to collect detailed information regarding each sex worker’s
recent business transactions. The first two sections of Part I detail the sex workers’ personal charac-
teristics and work-related information. A set of questions aiming to capture the sex workers’ work
attitudes and preferences is also included. For example, they are asked to rank the factors they use
to determine whether they will approach the client and how they will price the service. They are
also asked to rate how much they like/dislike the clients of different ethnicities. We ask them to
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provide the reasons for why they prefer clients of one ethnicity over another, given that the clients
have similar looks and the same service price. The fourth section in Part I is answered by the enu-
merators, where they are required to rate the interviewees on aspects such as beauty, physical figure
and English skills (from the perspective of the clients) immediately after they finish the interview.
Rating the sex workers from the client’s point of view is a common practice widely adopted in
surveys with sex workers (i.e Surveys with the legal sex workers in Mexico and Ecuador). In Part
II, we ask the sex workers a series of questions regarding the most recent 4 to 7 transactions. Both
English and Chinese versions of the survey forms were prepared for use.
The survey questionnaires have undergone iterative revisions. The early versions were drafted after
conversations and interviews with sex workers and industry insiders. The face-to-face conversa-
tions with the insiders from different networks enabled us to cross-verify the information they pro-
vided. The surveys were not fully rolled out until we finalized the questionnaires. As a final check,
each enumerator was asked to interview his/her close contacts, and to brief us on the responses of
the interviewees as well as how the interviews were actually conducted. We then modified possible
responses to close-ended questions and reworded the questions, as well as coached enumerators to
rephrase the questions in a way the sex workers are able to better understand in cases where reading
questions directly from the survey does not work.
Training of Enumerators
Three enumerators were hired to perform the surveys. Each had been personally involved in this
market and was friends with either the prostitutes or the pimps. We were able to conduct phone and
personal interviews with the sex workers and pimps via their connections. They also introduced the
sex workers’ regular patrons to us to enable us to gather facts about the clients’ preferences. Our
knowledge of the institutional background of Geylang Street was acquired through these casual
interactions with insiders.
Since each enumerator was hired at different points during the study, they were trained indepen-
dently. The training officially started with an overview of our project and questioning enumerators
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about the industry. For questions they were not able to immediately answer, they either provided
feedback after checking with their contacts or set up appointments for us to talk to their contacts
directly. Through this process, enumerators obtained a better understanding of the research objec-
tives and background. Then, I thoroughly went through each question to explain why I ask it, how
the questions should be asked and the preferred recording format. I encouraged them to write notes
on the survey if the sex worker offers additional feedback.
2.4.1.2 Data Collection
It is not feasible to fully randomize the sample in this market for four reasons.
First, due to the underground nature of this business, we do not have complete information on the
composition of the population and the exact geographical distribution of the sex workers.
Second, the fact that some of the sex workers from Geylang are controlled by pimps reduces our
ability to randomize the sample. These sex workers do not have the autonomy to accept interview
invitations. I needed to invite pimps for drinks or pass gift vouchers to the pimps in order to obtain
their consent for the interview, and these requests were not always approved.
Third, due to social stigma and the desire to preserve their own safety, some sex workers refused to
be interviewed especially when I explained that I needed to record all their responses. Relatedly,
the more experienced sex workers were more open to our interview requests compared to the timid
newcomers.
Fourth, the enumerators had a higher chance of interviewing less attractive sex workers, as they
have longer unemployment periods during each shift and are more tempted by the gift voucher we
offer. However, this is where we expected the enumerator’s networks to help them access different
kinds of sex workers to maintain a balanced sample composition.
Nonetheless, we compensated for the limited control by obtaining a good mixture of sex workers
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in other ways. This was done by visiting different lanes in Geylang at different times of the night
and on different days of the week. Different lanes may feature sex workers from varying countries
at varying prices. Based on interview results, the sex workers reported the existence of informal
“turfs” similar to gang turfs, whereby there are unspoken rules about which sex worker can operate
in which lanes. In terms of different times, the more popular sex workers are more likely to start
work later at night than the less popular ones. Also, we visited the lanes on different days because
the more popular sex workers are also more likely to take some weekdays off, as compared to less
popular ones.
This strategy ensures a moderately randomized sample. The enumerator’s decision to visit certain
lanes at certain times is not influenced by any factor that will cause them to generally meet the
same type of sex workers all the time.
Furthermore, while customers’ arrival rate and work intensity may follow a pattern across time
of night and days of the week, the probability that a sex worker is idle and willing to accept the
interview at any random visit of the enumerator is fairly random.
I focus solely on heterosexual transactions where the women are the sellers and the men are the
buyers, since females represent the majority of the sellers in the adult service market in Singapore.
The enumerators were mandated to read a letter of consent and to gain the sex workers’ under-
standing before starting the interviews. Each interview was expected to take about 30-45 minutes.
The enumerator was paid at a rate of 15 Singapore Dollars for each survey they collected and each
interviewee received a gift voucher of 10 Singapore Dollars to compensate for her time. Some-
times the sex workers agreed to take the survey as a favor to our enumerators and did not ask for
a monetary reward. In those cases, the enumerators invited them for a simple meal and conducted
the interview either during the meal or on a separate occasion.
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2.4.1.3 After Collection
I scrutinized the finished surveys carefully to weed out major mistakes, especially in the early
stages. Some of the early submissions of the surveys were excluded from the database. Reviewing
the survey right after the submission allowed me to correct errors immediately before the enumer-
ators forgot the information and before it was entered into the computer. Data-entering personnel
recorded any unconventional answers following the rules we formulated and made notes on a sep-
arate sheet for the changes for each data point. For example, many of the sex workers could not
recall the exact amount of their earnings and their clients’ ages. Thus, the data entry personnel
calculated the average using the range provided and made a note of these changes. This proce-
dure allowed me to have a consistent answer format for each question and enabled me to trace the
changes I made to the raw data.
2.4.2 Data Description
The data has a panel structure where information on the sex workers’ recent transactions along
with the characteristics and preferences of the sex workers were collected. The sample consists
of 177 street sex workers from Geylang with a total number of 805 transactions. The average
number of transactions the sex workers reported is 4. There were 674 transactions where the sex
workers initiated the price and 131 transactions where the clients initiated the price. The latter
131 transactions are used as a basis for checking the clients’ pricing behavior and consumption
capability.
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2.4.2.1 The Sex Workers’ Characteristics
Singapore has a rich composition of sex workers in the illegal market. My sample includes street
sex workers from Thailand, China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore11 (see Table 2.5). Sex work-
ers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Sri Lanka are less common but are also active and concentrated
in the low-end market. As expected, the sex workers in my dataset have low educational attainment.
72 percent of the sample completed only primary education, and 21 percent of these women are
illiterate. Less than 10 percent of the sample have been educated beyond high school. The average
age of the sex workers is 20, with the youngest aged 18 and the oldest aged 39. The majority of
the sex workers in the sample are single (82.5 percent) and 23 percent have at least one child. Over
half the sample have at least 2 years’ experience as a sex worker prior to working in Singapore12.
The average sex worker works in Singapore for about 2 years.
Sex workers on Geylang Street are full-time sex workers. It is reported that they work 6-7 days a
week (see Table 2.6). The average daily working hours are 9 hours on weekdays and 11 hours over
the weekends. The average number of customers the sex workers have a day is about 413. Earnings
from providing sexual services are a major source of the sex worker’s income. Other forms of
income are tips or earnings from being booked by the clients for a whole day. The average unit
price for sex is S$70 with lowest rate of $30 and highest rate of S$20014. The average service
duration is around 55 minutes when excluding overnight services.
11Sex workers from Taiwan, Philippines and Eastern Europe are often found in higher-end markets like Orchard Tower
and nightclubs.
12There is a group of sex workers who entered this industry with prior exposure. For example, the pimps either
purposefully traveled to rural mountains in Thailand to select candidates or relied on local pimps in the supplying
country to send the candidates. One of the most favored groups of sex workers in the market consists of newcomers.
13World Bank reports that Bangladeshi brothel sex workers have 2 customers a day whereas street and hotel sex
workers have 2-6 customers a day.
14The rate in legal brothels in Geylang is fixed at S$50 per 20 minutes, half of which goes to brothel owner. It is
typical for a legal brothel sex worker to serve 10-20 customers a day, as the average duration for each service is about
20 minutes.
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2.4.2.2 Transaction and Client Characteristics
Sex workers receive clients from a wide age range and of different ethnicities. The client’s age
can range from 20 to 60. Singapore is a multiracial society. The male population is 74 percent
Chinese, 13 percent Malay and 9 percent Indian [Ministry of Statistics, Singapore]. Together with
the inflow of foreign laborers and tourists, the pool of men patronizing sex workers is comprised
of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Caucasians, Middle Easterners, Indians, Malays, Bangladeshis and
other Asians. The Chinese, Caucasians, Indians and Bangladeshis are the major consumers of
adult services in Geylang (see Table 2.7). Together, the Chinese and the Caucasians represent 50
percent of our client sample. One out of five clients in our sample are regular customers, and about
30 percent of the total clients are tourists. Most of the transactions take place in either motels
(70 percent) or hotels (22 percent). Only about 6 percent of the transactions occur in the client’s
residence. There is very high awareness of contraception among both clients and sex workers in
Singapore. Over 99 percent of the transactions in my sample involve the use of condoms.
2.4.2.3 Price Discrepancy
Price differentials in adult services among racial groups were documented by Levitt and Dubner
[2010] in Super FreakEconomics. They report that white people pay $9 extra per sexual service
than black customers, while the Hispanic customers lie somewhere in between in Chicago’s pros-
titution market. A similar type of price discrepancy is observed in Geylang. Sex workers ask
Caucasians for an extra S$17 per sexual service relative to the Chinese. Bangladeshi clients are
asked for S$25 less than the Chinese. The final price that Caucasians will pay for sexual service
is S$13 higher than what the Chinese pay, while the final price the Chinese pay is S$25 higher
than what Bangladeshis pay (see Table 2.1). The observed initial price differentials could be due
to sorting of clients and sex workers, or the sex workers’ discrimination. Because the final price
is determined by the interaction of both sex workers and clients, it is not clear that the disparity
is caused by discrimination. Thus, I will analyze this question more rigorously in Section 2.6 and
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show that sex workers’ price discrimination is indeed the predominant driver of price disparity.
2.4.2.4 The Sex Workers’ Preference and Matching with Clients
The sex workers reveal distinct attitudes towards clients of different ethnicities. They consistently
favor Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Caucasian clients. On a scale of 1 (dislike) to 5 (like very
much) with 3 being “like”, these three client groups earn an average rating of 4 (see Table 2.2).
The sex workers collectively express their fondness towards these clients for the following reasons:
(1) Chinese clients are more likely to be returning customers; and, (2) the Caucasian, Korean
and Japanese clients are more willing to pay. This observation is uniform even across the more
attractive and less attractive sex workers, as well as across sex worker’s country of origin (see
Table 2.2). However, the less attractive sex workers rate Caucasian, Korean and Japanese more
highly by a magnitude of one, as compared to the more attractive sex workers.
In contrast, the Malay and Indian clients earn low average ratings of 2.74 and 2.07, respectively.
The rating disparity is more exaggerated among Indian and Bangladeshi clients. Bangladeshis
receive a higher rating than both the Malays and the Indians at 3.10, despite having the lowest
reservation price. It turns out their rating is inflated by the preference of the less attractive sex
workers who give them a rating of 3.29. Attractive sex workers give the lowest rating of 1.77 to
Indians.
To understand the motivation behind sex worker’s preference against Indians, we asked “Given the
same price and equally attractive client, do you prefer ethnic X to ethnic Y and why?” and “What
is the reason for a failed bargain?” in the survey. 24 subjects on Geylang Street responded to the
former question with a combined total of 66 responses from all the venues (street, bars and night-
clubs). Based on these responses and informal conversation with sex workers and pimps, we firmly
believe Indian clients are less popular among sex workers mainly because of their body odor, dark
skin tone, less expected wealth, and to a lesser extent, because they are more demanding/rough
and bargain a lot. The characteristic of being demanding/rough could take the form of requesting
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a longer or more strenuous service or more adventurous activities during the service. Many sex
workers make direct comparisons between seemingly similar groups like Bangladeshis and Indi-
ans, and voiced their preferences for the former over latter specifically because Indians take more
service time and are often not able to match the price for it. Some interviewees justify their distaste
towards Indians by claiming that Indian men have a higher probability of being sexually violent15.
The sex workers’ distaste towards dark skin tones places the Malays, Indians and Bangladeshis at
a disadvantage 16. While Malays and Indians are visually distinctly different, it is hard for one to
distinguish an Indian man and a Bangladeshi man. Feedback from sex workers and pimps suggest
that they uniformly judge the men with lighter skin tone as Bangladeshi. It may not be a well-
justified way to categorize these two ethnicities, but it is the raw method sex workers adopted to
mark clients.
There are moderate degrees of matching between sex workers and the clients. Over 80 percent of
transactions (see Table 2.3) involving the perceived wealthy client groups (Caucasian, Korean and
Japanese) are associated with more attractive sex workers. Most of the less attractive sex workers
are attached to less desired clients (Bangladeshis, Malays and Indians). In particular, 93 percent
of all Caucasians are attached to more attractive sex workers and 93 percent of Bangladeshis are
attached to less attractive sex workers. Singaporean Indian sex workers, the least favored group
because of their dark tone, are mainly attached with either with Indian men or Bangladeshi men.
Nevertheless, every sex worker has Chinese clients. Half of Chinese men in my sample deal with
more attractive sex workers and the remaining half go with less attractive ones. No specific sex
worker type is matched to a particular clients’ age group.
In addition, sex workers have a set of criteria that determine whether they will approach potential
customers and how they set the initial price. The top three factors influencing such behavior are:
15According to Survey International Men and Gender Equitable Survey (IMAGES) by the Centre of Research on
Women, US, 24% of Indian men have committed sexual violence at some point in their lives and 20% admitted to
having forced their wives or partners to have sex. In contrast, only 2% of Brazilian men and 9% of men in Chile,
Rwanda, Croatia and Mexico have committed sexual violence.
16In Singapore, most Indian men mostly have dark skin.
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“the money the client spends on them”17, “Ethnicity of the client” and the “Looks of the client”.
It is evident that sex workers rely on the client’s ethnicity as a critical signal to make business
decisions.
2.5 Identification
2.5.1 Estimation Equations
We perform the following three regressions:
Pr(Move)ij = α1 + β1Ej + δ1Oij + γ1Aij + σ′1G′i + η′1C′j + εij (2.9)
ln Priceij = α2 + κiWi + β2Ej + δ2Oij + γ2Aij + λ2Tij + σ′2G′i + η′2C′j + μij (2.10)
Pr(Fail)ij = α3 + β3Ej + δ3Oij + γ3Aij + λ3Tij + σ′3G′i + η′3C′j + ij (2.11)
where i is the sex worker and j is the client; Oij , Lij and Tij are the ratings the sex worker gives to
the client based on his outfit, attractiveness and sweet talk18, respectively. Wi is the sex worker’s
fixed effects. Ej is the ethnicity of the client which is vector of dummy variables with 1 being the
comparison ethnic group and 0 being the base group (Chinese men). G′i is the set of sex workers’
characteristics, which includes the sex worker’s country of origin, age, years of experience, educa-
tion, marital status, beauty and English skills. C ′j is the set of client characteristics, which includes
the client’s age, whether he is a regular customer and whether he is a tourist. All three equations
have similar controls, except that the variable recording the client’s sweet talk is not added into the
equation 2.9. For estimation of the probability of failed bargains, additional explanatory variables
like the sex worker’s bargaining skills and the transaction day are added.
17“The money spent on them” means whether the clients have bought any gifts or given tips. It generally applies to
sex workers who have regular customers.
18Sweet talk captures the flirtation between the sex worker and the client. We control for this factor because the sex
workers indicated in the survey that their decisions on price may be influenced by the client’s sweet talk.
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For the purpose of this study, I restrict the sample to cases where the sex workers suggest the initial
price. Only one out of eight transactions involved the client suggesting the initial price. These
transactions are used to verify the sex worker’s beliefs (i.e to check whether the perceived wealthy
group would suggest a higher price).
Equation (2.10) runs a (sex worker’s) fixed-effects regression of the log initial price. It is the
pillar of the analysis, as it reveals whether the sex workers exercise price discrimination and it
also pinpoints the determinants of such discrimination. Estimation results from the remaining
regressions are used as auxiliary tools to help identify whether the price discrimination is taste-
based or statistical.
I use a fixed-effects on logit equation (2.9) to study whether the sex workers approach the clients
first. It is not feasible for us to track their activities continuously throughout a given week or a day.
Therefore, we do not have a record of whether the sex workers approached every potential client
who walked by. However, we do know whether the sex worker is the first to approach the client.
This proxy effectively captures the sex workers’ tendency to approach clients. Due to the loss of
observations when performing a fixed-effects logit regression, I also conduct a probit regression to
compare the results.
Equation (2.11) examines the outcome of price negotiation. We define the probability of the bar-
gaining process failing as the probability of the client rejecting an offer. The failure to reach a
deal after negotiations could either be because the client does not want to pay the initial price, or
because the sex worker does not want to take the lower counter-offer. Both possibilities reflect the
client’s rejection of the initial proposed price. For later reference, it is worth mentioning that our
data show that over 90 percent of failed bargains are caused by price disagreement. Both fixed-
effects logit and probit regressions are performed for this estimation. I rely on probit regression
for later analysis because logit fixed effect causes the loss of a large number of observations and
results in less precise estimates.
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2.5.2 Identification Strategy
The parameters of interest in this study are β1, β2 and β3. Three possible cases are identified using
these parameters.
Case 1. Statistical discrimination + No/Weak Taste Discrimination:
β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0
For example, let us compare the group of men who are believed to have a higher willingness to pay,
the Caucasians, with the group who are believed to have a lower willingness to pay, the Chinese. If
there is no or weak taste-based discrimination, we expect the sex workers to more actively approach
Caucasians than Chinese, assuming that they are both equally well dressed and not disliked. Sex
workers will suggest a higher service price to Caucasians and negotiations with them are less likely
to fail.
Case 2. Taste Discrimination + No/Weak Statistical discrimination:
β1 < 0, β2 > 0, β3 > 0
Here, let us compare the base group (Chinese) with the disliked group (Indians). If statistical
discrimination plays a minor role or no role, then we would expect sex workers to be less likely to
approach Indians and more likely to put forward a higher initial price. Negotiations with Indians
are also more likely to fail.
Case 3. No Statistical discrimination + No Taste Discrimination:
β1 = β2 = β3 = 0
This is a trivial case. When there is no discrimination, we should observe an equal treatment
towards clients of all ethnicities.
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2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 Price Discrimination
I discussed the observed initial price discrepancy (proposed by the sex workers) in section 2.4.2.3.
With the aid of empirical evidence, I showed that the price disparity is due to discrimination in this
section. One potential argument for the price discrepancy between the perceived wealthy clients
(the Caucasians, Koreans and Japanese) and the Chinese clients is that the former are more likely
to be tourists who patronize the market during peak holiday seasons, when demand is high. This
could be why the sex workers hiked initial prices. To offset this effect, I conducted the survey
during the off-peak months.
Sorting between sex workers and clients is a more pressing concern. The matching of more at-
tractive sex workers and more wealthy client groups and the matching between less attractive sex
workers with seemingly less wealthy clients suggest the possibility that the richer clients are paying
higher prices for the premium services they buy, not because they face any sort of discrimination.
Here, I want to reemphasize that clients claim that sex workers are highly substitutable in their
eyes. While richer client groups favor the more beautiful sex workers because they can afford
them, our interviews suggest that the less wealthy within the group are also equally happy to buy
services from less attractive workers. To show that the price differentials are driven by sex work-
ers’ discrimination, I employ sex worker’s fixed-effects regression, which helps to purge the price
differential caused by matching.
I examine the estimates from sex worker’s fixed-effects regression on (log) initial price, as shown in
Equation (2.10), using the transactions where the sex workers initiated the price. This is regarded
as the benchmark regression and is referred to as ‘original’ regression in subsequent tables. Both
Chinese clients and Indian clients are used as the reference groups for analyzing prices and other
dependent variables. The sex workers place an 18 percent premium on services with Caucasians
and a 18 percent discount for Bangladeshis in comparison to the Chinese (see column (3)-(5) in
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Table 2.8). More attractive sex workers place 16 percent higher initial prices on Indians as com-
pared to Chinese. Random effect estimates agree with fixed-effects in this finding. OLS estimate
indicates a 13 percent premium on the prices quoted to the Caucasians. Fixed-effects and OLS
estimates together suggest that the majority of the initial price differences between client groups
are not driven by differences between sex workers, which could be potentially caused by matching,
but by price variations imposed by each individual sex worker, namely the within variation. We
adopt fixed-effects estimates for analysis hereafter as it is the recommended specification based
on the results of Hausman test. When taking Bangladeshis as the base group, all other ethnicities
receive significantly higher initial prices, with Caucasians receiving the largest hike of 44 percent.
Caucasian clients receive a 19 percent and 14 percent higher initial price than Malays and Indi-
ans respectively. On the other hand, no significant initial price disparity is observed between the
Chinese and the Malays for any identical sex worker.
Price discrimination is often observed in markets where the customers have identifiable traits and
services are not resalable. In my study, in addition to ethnicity, these traits include the client’s outfit
and whether the client is a tourist. But, the most important factor is the client’s ethnicity. Ethnicity
alone explains 46 percent within variability in price differentials. Adding the variable ethnicity also
helps to explain an additional 6 percent of the within variations in initial prices after controlling for
the sex workers’ and clients’ characteristics. On the other hand, the better-dressed customers are
quoted prices that are 9 percent higher than those who are less well-dressed. Tourists also pay a 7
percent price premium compared to local customers19.
2.6.2 Statistical Discrimination v.s Taste-based Discrimination
In this subsection, I shed light on the nature of the sex workers’ discriminative behavior. Study-
ing initial prices alone is sufficient to draw a robust conclusion on the sources of discrimination.
Following the identification strategy derived from my theoretical model, I collectively scrutinize
19See more discussion about the impact of the client’s outfit and looks on sex workers’ discriminative behavior in
section 2.6.4.
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the estimates from equation (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) by studying how the sex worker decides to
approach clients, how she sets the initial prices and the outcomes of bargaining. Because of the
sorting effect, both estimates from the full sample and the subsample (as determined by the sex
workers’ beauty) are examined.
Empirical findings suggest that the sex workers’ discriminative behavior is largely profit-driven and
also reflects a high degree of taste preference. The discussion on the nature of price discrimination
in my case study is twofold. First, I investigate the sex workers’ treatment of the Caucasians and the
Bangladeshis, in which I argue that there is a strong presence of statistical discrimination. Second,
I argue that the sex workers practice taste-based discrimination against Indians.
2.6.2.1 Statistical Discrimination
Caucasian
Table 2.10. summarizes the estimates from three estimation equations with the full sample and
subsamples. Sex workers are 17 percent more likely to approach Caucasian clients compared
to Chinese clients, and impose an 18 percent premium on the initial price for Caucasians. The
bargaining process with Caucasians is slightly less likely to fail than the bargaining process with
the Chinese. However, the difference in failure rates is not statistically significant.
According to the identification strategy derived earlier, the ideal case for statistical discrimination
mandates a higher probability of failed bargains with the Chinese than with the Caucasians. This is
based on the assumption that the sex workers’ belief regarding the Caucasians’ higher reservation
price is true, and that the two client groups possess the same market information as well as equal
bargaining skills. However, the small difference in the bargaining outcomes between the two eth-
nicities could be due to a violation of these assumptions. Firstly, Chinese men are more familiar
with the local market. Knowing this, sex workers are more likely to suggest an initial price that is
closer to the men’s true willingness to pay. This results in higher bargaining success rates with the
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Chinese clients even though they are only willing to pay lower prices. Secondly, Chinese clients
are more accustomed to and are more capable at bargaining, or at least this is what the sex workers
have reported. The sex workers cherry-pick Caucasian men because they are more likely to seal
the deal with Caucasian clients at a higher rent rate with an equal amount of bargaining effort.
Hence, heterogeneity in the bargaining behavior of the clients could potentially contract the gap in
the bargaining outcome between the two groups. Therefore, I conclude that sex workers exercise
statistical discrimination against Caucasian clients.
Recall that the more attractive sex workers are popular among both Chinese and Caucasian clients,
especially for the latter. Over 90 percent of Caucasians are attached to beautiful sex workers.
Hence, the observed results are mainly driven by the behavior of these more attractive sex workers.
Attractiveness grants sex workers more market power. The more attractive sex workers are able to
demand a 22 percent premium on the initial price proposed to Caucasians, which is 4 percent higher
than what the less attractive workers ask for. Assuming both types of sex workers are providing the
same service, this 4 percent margin can be considered as a form of beauty premium.
The more attractive sex workers rate Chinese high at 4.13, which is half a point more than the rating
for Caucasians, even though they expect a higher transaction profit from Caucasians. I believe that
this higher rating is based on their intrinsic preference for Chinese clients, because they believe
Chinese men are more likely to be repeat customers.
Recognizing that the matching between Caucasians and less attractive sex worker is low, I briefly
comment on these sex workers’ behavior here. Although the less attractive sex workers cannot
compete with more attractive sex workers in appearance, they make up for it by being more proac-
tive in approaching potential clients. They are 28 percent more likely to approach the Caucasians
than the Chinese.
It is worth mentioning that the enumerators hired for the survey are Asians, and presumably, they
rank the sex workers’ beauty by Asian standards. There is a level of subjectivity involved, as
some sex workers who appear to be less attractive to the Asian enumerator (or clients) may be
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considered attractive to Caucasians. If the less attractive sex workers are aware of this subjectivity,
then it is not surprising to find that they approach Caucasians more proactively. In short, this is
also a full and precise demonstration that the sex workers’ discriminative actions are deliberate.
They discriminate statistically based on wealth indicators (the client’s ethnicity) and their asset
endowment (beauty).
Bangladeshis
Likewise, I find that the sex workers statistically discriminate against Bangladeshis as compared
to the Chinese. Again, the sex worker’s attractivenss is an important factor that affects the way
in which this discrimination occurs. I will first address the similarities in their behaviors before
moving on to the key differences.
Both attractive and less attractive sex workers propose lower initial prices to Bangladeshi clients
with a discount of 24 percent and 20 percent, respectively. This is somewhat expected because the
majority of Bangladeshis in Singapore are hard laborers and earn only 20 Singapore Dollars (17
USD) a day. Thus, the fact that Bangladeshi clients have the lowest willingness to pay is not private
information in this market, and is likely to have contributed to the lower initial prices. Moreover,
both the attractive and less attractive sex workers experience a higher likelihood of bargaining
failure when dealing with Bangladeshis, which is 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
The key difference between the two groups of sex workers lies in the probability of approaching
Bangladeshis. A perfect case of statistical discrimination predicts that if sex workers discriminate
against the Bangladeshis due to their lower reservation price, then they should have a significantly
lower probability of approaching Bangladeshi clients than Chinese clients. However, I detect the
contrary phenomenon among the less attractive sex workers. While the attractive sex workers are
24 percent less likely to approach Bangladeshi, less attractive sex workers are equally likely to
approach both client groups.
The fact that over 90 percent of the transactions with Bangladeshis are conducted by the less at-
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tractive sex workers sheds some light on this seemingly puzzling finding. Active engagement with
Bangladeshi clients implies less attractive sex workers face gloomy market prospects and are forced
to take the less profitable and less favored share of the pie to survive. In order to secure less desir-
able but much-needed clients, they approach Bangladeshis as often as they approach the Chinese
even though Bangladeshis are not able to match the prices that the Chinese are able to pay. Thus,
it is clear that less attractive sex workers positively discriminate against Bangladeshis.
Lastly, I assess the possibility of taste discrimination. As mentioned, the sex workers find clients
with dark skin tones distasteful. Both Bangladeshi and Indian men are usually regarded to have
darker skin. However, intriguingly, every pimp and sex worker interviewed insisted that they can
distinguish between Indian and Bangladeshi men, and claim that Bangladeshis are fairer than In-
dians. We are not able to confirm whether their judgment is accurate. But, what we can conclude
is that they have a way to identify Bangladeshis and they do not have any distaste towards the
characteristics that the identified Bangladeshi men possess. I will further clarify this discussion
by directly comparing sex workers’ actions towards Indians and Bangladeshis in the subsequent
subsection.
2.6.2.2 Robustness Check
Our conclusion about statistical discrimination may be biased if the services provided to clients of
different ethnicities by each individual sex worker are not homogeneous. For this reason, I reex-
amine the price equation by controlling for a set of service characteristics, such as actual service
duration, types of sexual acts20, venue of transaction and transaction day.
In studies of sexual service prices in the commercial sex market, both Gertler et al. [2005] and Mof-
fatt and Peters [2004] have controlled for the service duration when estimating the price equation.
I did not include the service duration in previous regression exercises because it is not conventional
to set the service time during price negotiation in this market (based on the interviews). The direct
20A sexual act could be vaginal penetration, oral sex, handjob or anal sex.
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influence of service time on price setting is expected to be weak. Meanwhile, we have a lot of
missing values pertaining to service characteristic variables. Adding these variables reduces the
sample size by about 200 observations, which could potentially lead to less precise estimations.
Regardless, we do recognize that the sex workers have a sense of the expected service duration for
each ethnic group, and may set prices that incorporate this expectation. In my sample, the average
service duration with the Caucasian men is about twice as long as that with the Chinese men and
Indian men, and three times longer than that with the Bangladeshis and Malays21. This suggests
that service duration could be a key determinant of the initial price differential observed between
the Chinese and Caucasians, as well as between the Chinese and Bangladeshi.
Different sexual acts are sold as a combo in most of the transactions. On average, 2 types of sexual
acts are sold in each transaction. Only 18 percent of transactions involve solely vaginal penetration
and only 1 percent involves solely oral sex. 22 Sex workers may require a higher compensation for
the client group they deem to be more demanding during the transaction.
Table 2.11 summarizes the estimates from fixed effects with different controls. Column (1) contains
the original fixed effects on initial prices I have discussed earlier; Column (3) and (4) list the fixed
effects estimates after controlling for service duration and types of sexual acts23. Column (5)
presents the results after controlling for both duration and sexual acts, venue of transaction and
transaction day.
I find that the sex workers’ price discrimination against Caucasians (relative to Chinese) is primar-
ily due to their demand for longer service duration. Such price discrimination is neither associated
with intensity of sexual acts performed during the transactions nor where and when the transactions
occurred. The price differential between Caucasians and Chinese is reduced from 18 percent to 8
21Average service duration (excluding overnight service) for transactions is 94 minutes (Caucasians), 55 minutes
(Chinese), 60 minutes (Japanese/Koreans), 44 minutes (Indians), 37 minutes (Malays) and 38 minutes (Bangladeshis).
We include the overnight transactions when actual service duration is controlled in the regression.
22Among all transactions, 77 percent involves vaginal penetration, 35 percent involves anal sex, 50 percent involves
oral sex and 1 percent involves only a handjob.
23All 13 combinations of the sexual acts are controlled in the regression, many of the combinations are automatically
dropped due to colinearity
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percent (see column(3) in Table 2.11) after the service duration is controlled. This price difference
also becomes statistically insignificant. After sexual acts are taken into account, discrimination
is more pronounced with a 20 percent (see column(4) in Table 2.11) higher price for Caucasians
which indicates that Chinese clients could be more demanding compared to Caucasians. When all
the service characteristics are controlled in column (5), the price disparity between the Caucasians
and Chinese disappears. Nevertheless, my argument about the sex workers’ statistical discrimi-
nation against the Caucasians remains intact, because the sex workers use the potential client’s
ethnicity as an indicator of the expected service time. They know that Caucasians are more likely
to buy longer services. Thus, they are willing to approach Caucasians more frequently24. Because
competition among the sex workers is severe and waiting is costly, it is not surprising to observe
that sex workers prefer selling their services to Caucasians. They are able to make a higher profit
from transactions with Caucasians than with the Chinese through a slightly inflated price and longer
service duration.
For Bangladeshis, the argument of statistical price discrimination stands firm, except the price
discount for Bangladeshi drops from 18 percent to 13 percent (see column(5) in Table 2.11). This
consistently reflects the shorter service duration and lower labor intensity for transactions with
Bangladeshi.
Notice that we lost about 200 observations after adding additional variables in regressions. Taking
the smaller sample for regressions in column (3) and (5), I conduct robustness checks by running
regressions without controlling for these variables and present the results in column (6) and (7). I
confirm that the changes in the estimates for both Caucasians and Bangladeshis from column (1)
to column (3) are not due to the sample bias. However, the disappearing of price disparity for
Caucasians and the changes in estimates from column (1) to column (5) may be potentially caused
by the sample reduction. In this case, the sample bias problem is of less concern, as we know that
sex workers’ expectations about the service duration with each client group affects their behaviors,
24After the duration is controlled, the probability that the sex worker will approach a Caucasian client relative to a
Chinese one is reduced from 17 percent to 13 percent (p-value=0.105)
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and it is not their expectation about work intensity that matters. As the last check, I re-run the fixed
effects by pooling the full sample, rather than using the transactions where sex workers initiate the
prices. (See Column (2) in Table 2.11). The statistical price discrimination that favors Bangladeshi
and works against Caucasians remain strong.
2.6.3 Taste-based Discrimination
The sex workers’ behavioral responses towards Indian men forms an interesting case of taste-based
discrimination. Recall the reasoning behind sex workers’ distaste towards Indian men: body odor,
dark skin tone, less wealthy, more demanding/rough and bargain a lot. While the accusation regard-
ing the body odor and dark skin tone can be clearly viewed as sex workers’ pure taste preferences,
the other reasons could arguably be interpreted as either labor cost boosters or taste preference
determinants. Following the format in previous subsection, I first show the existence of taste dis-
crimination without considering these cost boosting factors like service duration, service types.
Then, I will discuss how my results persist even when these factors are controlled.
Indian v.s Chinese
I begin the analysis with the more attractive sex worker group. Facing high demand, beautiful
sex workers are less constrained to achieve max profit and have the luxury of avoiding disliked
clients. They minimize contacts with Indians, which is shown by their significantly lower tendency
to approach Indian men (24 percent less likely as compared to their rate of approach to Chinese
men). They demand a high premium of 16 percent on the initial price from potential Indian clients
to compensate for the expected utility loss from the transaction (if they decided to sell), as well as
to discourage the Indians from further negotiation (if they do not intend to sell). Table 2.17 lists the
OLS regression results on the initial price proposed by the clients. Interestingly, the initial price
given by Indian clients is relatively lower. They suggest an initial price that is 16 percent lower
than the prices given by the Chinese, which implies that Indians may have a lower reservation
price. Moreover, I find that bargaining with Indian men is 28 percent more likely to fail. This is an
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expected result since beautiful sex workers try to deter Indian men with inflated prices, knowing
that Indians are not able or are unwilling to match that price.
In a nutshell, beautiful sex workers want to avoid Indians so they impose inflated initial prices so
that the bargaining process has a higher chance of failing (in comparison to the Chinese). In other
words, the beautiful sex workers practice taste-based discrimination against Indians.
The situation holds even with the less attractive sex workers, except that they do not impose inflated
initial prices on Indians. Similar to the argument I presented in the case of Bangladeshi men, the
equal pricing is due to the fact that the less attractive sex workers are less desired and possess
less market power. However, this finding about less attractive sex workers should not alter the
conclusion that sex workers taste-discriminate against Indians.
Indian v.s Bangladeshi
It is useful to make an additional comparison between Indians and Bangladeshis because they
are considered visually indistinguishable by the general public. By studying the initial prices
Bangladeshis propose and sex workers’ preferences, we learn that Bangladeshi clients have the
lowest willingness to pay but are not rated as the least preferred client group, whereas Indians
earn the lowest fondness rating from both attractive and less attractive sex workers. Column (1)
in Table 2.12 shows that sex workers set 20 percent higher initial prices on Indians compared to
Bangladeshis. If such premiums are due to sex workers’ belief about Indian clients’ higher willing-
ness to pay, then we should expect they will be more motivated to approach Indian men. However,
the converse result is detected. Sex workers are 16 percent more likely to approach Bangladeshi
men as compared to Indian men. Therefore, some amount of sex worker taste preference must be
causing these results. The bargaining with both Bangladeshis and Indians are equally likely to fail.
This result is less surprising as sex workers dislike Bangladeshis because of their poor ability to
pay and dislike Indians for taste reasons. Prima facie, sex workers’ price patterns are marked by
their taste discrimination towards Indians.
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2.6.3.1 Robustness Check
Critically speaking, one may view the expected heavy duty transactions and prolonged bargaining
with Indians as more labor (or time) intensive engagements ex-ante and argue that sex workers’
behavioral responses (lower rate of approach to Indians and asking for a higher initial price) can be
deemed as a form of statistical discrimination, which is based on the expectation of increased trans-
action costs rather than based on client’s willingness to pay. Here, I examine the extent to which
each of the factors influences sex workers’ decisions to approach and their pricing. I will show that
sex workers’ taste preference against Indians is a vital determinant of the price discrimination by
ruling out these alternative possibilities.
Long Duration
Let’s start with the simple comparison between Bangladeshis and Indians, as some sex workers
complain that Indians take more service time and they are often not able to match the price for it.
In an extreme case where sex workers statistically discriminate on cost, they will demand a higher
rate from Indians and will be more likely to approach Indians (just as they do with Caucasians),
knowing that Indians on average takes more time and are able to match the price for it. A more
likely scenario would be one in which the sex workers know the service duration with Indian is
longer but they are not able to match the price for it, in which case any rational sex worker will
be less likely to approach him and still ask for a higher price. If this hypothesis was true, then we
should expect to see that sex workers are equally likely to approach both Bangladeshis and Indians
and set the same prices for them (if they are deemed to have same willingness to pay). Or, in a
more possible outcome, sex workers more actively approach Indians and ask higher prices from
them in comparison with Bangladeshis (if Bangladeshis are deemed to be the less wealthy) when
service duration is controlled in the regression. Conversely, but as expected, these outcomes are not
detected when duration is controlled (see Column (3) in Table 2.12). 17 percent of an initial price
disparity persisted between Indians and Bangladeshis, hinting that the sex workers’ taste preference
plays a salient role.
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When compared with Chinese clients, the price disparity is further enlarged by 10 percent after
controlling for duration for the more attractive sex worker group. It signals that Chinese on average
have longer duration than Indians. Hence, Indians are not price discriminated by their demand for
longer service.
Tedious Bargaining
Median bargaining time with Indians is as long as that with Chinese, and it is longer than that with
Bangladeshis. In comparison with Bangladeshis, the price inflation placed on Indians dropped
from 20 percent to 17 percent after taking differences in bargaining time. This implies 3 percent
of price disparity could be explained by the longer expected bargaining time with Indians. It is
weak evidence supporting the fact that sex workers demand higher compensation from Indians
for the prolonged bargaining. Neither do I observe that Indians are more likely to be approached
compared to Bangladeshis after bargaining time is taken consideration. Likewise for the case
of Chinese clients, the more attractive sex worker group still imposes a 15 percent higher initial
price on Indians after controlled for bargaining time. They even more actively approach Chinese.
Therefore, the tedious bargaining with Indians plays a very minimal role in explaining the observed
sex workers’ actions and pricing strategies towards the Indians.
More Demanding and Rougher
That Indians are more demanding or rougher is a clear indication of high expected transaction cost
with Indians. Being demanding or rough entails the potential request of longer service or more
adventurous sexual acts, even a possibility of sexual violence. Since we have ruled out the longer
duration as a key cause, discussion here concerns only the latter parts. Sexual act, to certain extent,
is assumed to capture these heavy-duty aspects of transaction with Indians. Data confirms 1425
percent of all transactions involving anal sex are associated with Indians, whereas only 8 percent
are associated with Bangladeshis. Among all transactions Indians clients have, 49 percent of them
involve anal sex, which is close to the 53 percent rate of anal sex with Chinese clients, but is much
2556 percent of all transactions with Chinese involve anal sex, the largest proportion among all ethnic client groups.
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higher than the 13 percent rate with Bangladeshis. The price premium placed on Indians compared
to Chinese barely changed after controlling for sexual acts, as expected (for more attractive sex
worker group). The reduction on the price premium placed on Indians compared to Bangladeshis
is also negligible. Furthermore, sex workers as a whole do continue to more actively approach
Bangladeshis than Indians taking the sexual acts into account. These regression outputs suggest
that expected high maintenance for Indian clients cannot well explain the diverged behavior sex
workers have established against Indians relative to other clients.
Transaction Day
Controlling for expected service characteristics does not affect the initial price differential between
the Chinese and the Indian clients. I further test the robustness of the taste discrimination results by
finding connections between the variable client’s ethnicity with the transaction day. Sex workers are
15 percent (see column (2) in Table 2.15) less likely to approach Indian men on weekdays (Monday-
Thursday) and this likelihood is further reduced by an additional 23 percent (p-value=0.06) over
the weekend. It is very clear that sex workers are inclined to avoid Indians, but they implement
this preference strategically. They aim to strike a balance between minimizing work disutility and
maximizing monetary returns. Therefore, they approach Indian men less often over the weekend
when they have more demand.
As a last check, we rerun the regressions by controlling for duration, bargain time and sexual acts,
venue of transaction collectively. 10 percent price discrimination against Indians (in comparison to
Bangladeshis) has survived and sex workers are 24 percent more likely to approach Bangladeshis
than Indians. For more attractive sex workers, 13 percent (not statistically significant) price dis-
crimination against Indians remained and they are 41 percent more likely to approach Chinese than
Indians. In short, all the evidence strongly supports that discrimination against Indians is left to be
explained by sex workers’ taste preference (against dark skin tone and body odor).
I do recognize the potential shortcomings in this analysis. For example, I do not have information
on what time of the night the transactions take place and whether there is any sexual violence
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forced on sex worker in any transaction. In addition, while the preference against dark skin tone is
a clear taste preference, one may argue that serving a smelly client is like working at a dirty job,
therefore it increases the cost of service and is not entirely a taste preference. This is a debatable
assertion, just like some researchers believe people should not even call statistical discrimination
as discrimination. What I want to point out is that if even there is some marginal effect of such
cost, it is not expected to be large enough to absorb such large price dispersion.
Indian men are a minority in Singapore and only 10 percent of the client sample is represented
by Indians. Therefore, widespread prejudice is not required to yield results that show taste-based
discrimination. Rather, strong prejudice from a small number of sex workers would be sufficient
to sustain taste discrimination. However, it must be noted that the true magnitude of taste discrimi-
nation in this market could be understated in my findings, because the incidents where sex workers
avoid Indians are not captured in my data.
2.6.4 Miscellaneous Discussions
Other Ethnicities
As in the case of Caucasians, the sex workers carry out statistical discrimination against Japanese
and Korean clients by asking for a significantly higher initial price with a 9 percent premium.
However, there is no significant difference in their tendency to approach either Chinese clients or
Japanese and Korean clients, and the bargaining failure rate between these two groups is similar.
This less pronounced effect is driven by the fact that the majority of Japanese and Korean clients
who patronize the Geylang area are tourists who are often brought in by middlemen. The small
sample of Japanese and Korean clients may also bias the estimations results.
There is no price discrimination found between the Chinese and Malays. Bargaining with Malays
is 22 percent more likely to fail. They are less likely to be approached, but this difference is not
statistically significant. It seems that the Malay clients are less favored because the sex workers are
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not able to extract as much profit from them as from the Chinese. However, there is no convincing
evidence to support either statistical discrimination or taste-based discrimination.
Final Price and Discount
As a last step, we review the final price and discount26 of the negotiation. I run both OLS and
sex worker’s fixed-effects on these two variables and outputs are presented in Table 2.19. The
same control variables used in previous regressions are used here. Furthermore, the initial price,
bargaining time and sex worker’s bargaining skills are also added. We did not include the sex
worker’s rating of the client’s bargaining skills in both equations, as the rating given by the sex
worker could be biased by the outcome of the bargain.
Ideally speaking, some degree of final price discrimination is expected to be preserved. This could
better justify why sex workers discriminate in initial price in the first place. However, such results
did not emerge. The final price and discount may be influenced by unobservable external factors
such as how good the business is around the time of the negotiation and how active the police’s
patrol activities are. The bargaining skills of clients may also play a role in shaping the final price
and discount. We are not able to perfectly control for these factors which could potentially lead
to imprecise or inaccurate estimates observed. Caution must be taken when interpreting these
estimation results. One interesting point worth mentioning here is that the wealthier client groups
tend to receive a lesser discount than the less wealthy client groups.
Outfit and Attractiveness
Survey feedback shows that the client’s outfit is the third most important indicator that sex workers
use to decide whether or not to approach the client and in setting the initial price. I did not find
that the client’s outfit has any influence in motivating street walkers to make the first move, but
I do find that better dressed men received a 9 percent (see column (4) in Table 2.8) higher initial
price compared to the less well-dressed men. It may be because the outfit of the client is a noisier
26Discount is defined as (Initial price-Final price)/Initial Price*100
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and hence less reliable signal compared to ethnicity. It makes perfect sense for the situation in the
street market where most of clients are less well-off compared to the men in the high-end market
and who mostly dress casually27.
The sex workers’ taste-preference for the client’s appearance matters only to the extent that attractive-
looking men spur more proactive action from street walkers. An above average looking man is 19
percent more likely to be approached by the sex workers. The street walkers’ preference for looks
maintains a monotonic impact across all client ethnicities. This tendency to approach does not vary
by the client’s ethnicity. Given the distaste that the sex workers possess for the Indians, being an
attractive Indian client can significantly improve the probability (see Column (3) in Table 2.15) of
being approached by sex workers (in comparison to the Chinese). The more attractive clients do not
receive any preferential asking price, nor do they have a better chance of closing the deal. Thus, sex
workers also have a moderate preference for looks, but the preference has limited financial impact.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the important question of whether discrimination can persist in a competi-
tive market by testing Becker and Diamond’s model using reduced form estimations. Leveraging
the advantage of rich self-collected data from the commercial sex market in Singapore, I success-
fully show that discrimination can prevail in a highly competitive market. The finding supports
Diamond’s prediction that an infinitesimal amount of search cost of client can grant sellers the
monopoly power which results in equilibrium price discrimination.
Relying on the hybrid theory model I built, I am able to further identify the statistical discrimina-
tion using the client’s ethnicity as a wealth signal and taste-based discrimination using the client’s
ethnicity as a distaste indicator. There is a moderate degree of matching between client groups and
sex workers with different levels of attractiveness. Analysis is established on the comparable ethnic
2776 percent of the clients have a dress rating of below 4; 68 percent of the Bangladeshi clients have a rating of 1.
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client groups, as well as on particular client ethnic groups with particular groups of sex workers
accounting their matching characteristics. Different types of sex workers (i.e more attractive vs.
less attractive) maintain slightly differentiated discrimination tactics and they adjust their strategies
to adapt to market conditions accordingly.
In summary, I find strong evidence of both statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination,
although the statistical discrimination exhibits a more dominant influence. Sex workers exercise
statistical discrimination (primarily revealed in initial pricing) against Caucasians and in favor of
Bangladeshis, in comparison with Chinese clients. Believing that Caucasians are more wealthy, sex
workers set the initial price for them 18 percent higher as compared to that for the Chinese. Such
price inflation is mainly driven by the fact that sex workers are aware Caucasians are purchasing
the longer service and are financially capable of paying for it. Bangladeshi clients, who are known
to be less well off, receive 19 percent discount on initial price as compared to otherwise identical
Chinese clients.
Meanwhile, sex workers practice taste-based discrimination against Indian clients for their dark
skin tone and unpleasant odor when the treatment of Indians is compared with that of both Chi-
nese clients and Bangladeshi clients. Taste-based discrimination against Indians is particularly
pronounced among the more attractive sex workers who ask a 16 percent higher price from Indians
than from Chinese and a 32 percent higher price than from Bangladeshi clients.
I performed a set of robustness checks by incorporating the sex workers’ expectations regarding
what kind or type of services they will perform with each ethnic client group using the actual
service characteristics that I have collected. I am able to successfully solidify my conclusion of
taste-based discrimination against Indians by ruling out the possibility of statistical discrimination
by cost factors. When needed, robustness tests are also implemented to show that the results
obtained after adding service characteristics variables are not due to sample bias.
Statistical discrimination allows sex workers to maximize profit, while taste discrimination allows
them to minimize the disutility from working with disliked clients by cutting the contact with them.
69
The findings are consistent with the sex workers’ self-reported preferences and beliefs.
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Table 2.1: Average Service Price by Client’s Ethnicity
Ethnicity Initial Price* Final Price
Caucasian 92.82 81.34
JapaneseKorean 76.77 70.32
Chinese 74.38 68.68
Bangladeshi 49.03 43.74
Indian 71.88 62.75
Malay 67.14 57.69
* Initial Price proposed by the sex workers
Table 2.2: Sex Worker’s Fondness Rating on Clients
All Subsample Mean
(0=dislike, 5=like very much) Mean Std. Err. More
Beautiful*
Less
Beautiful
Caucasian 4.14 1.30 3.62 4.52
KoreanJapanese 3.94 1.32 3.58 4.21
Chinese 4.19 1.22 4.13 4.23
Bangladeshi 3.10 1.72 2.47 3.29
Malay 2.74 1.53 2.85 2.65
Indian 2.07 1.33 1.77 2.3
* More beautiful sex workers are the ones who are above median of overall attractiveness rating
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Table 2.3: Tabulation of Client’s Ethnicity by Sex Worker’s Beauty
Sex Worker’s Beauty
Ethnicity More Beautiful* Less Beautiful Total
Chinese 123 164 296
JapaneseKorean 11 41 56
Caucasian 7 99 107
Middle Eastern 6 30 36
Indian 64 20 86
Malay 42 15 60
Bangladesh 156 8 167
Total 409 377 808
Chinese 41.6% 55.4% 100.0%
JapaneseKorean 19.6% 73.2% 100.0%
Caucasian 6.5% 92.5% 100.0%
Middle Eastern 16.7% 83.3% 100.0%
Indian 74.4% 23.3% 100.0%
Malay 70.0% 25.0% 100.0%
Bangladesh 93.4% 4.8% 100.0%
Total 50.6% 46.7% 100.0%
Chinese 30.1% 43.5% 36.6%
JapaneseKorean 2.7% 10.9% 6.9%
Caucasian 1.7% 26.3% 13.2%
Middle Eastern 1.5% 8.0% 4.5%
Indian 15.6% 5.3% 10.6%
Malay 10.3% 4.0% 7.4%
Bangladesh 38.1% 2.1% 20.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
* More beautiful sex workers are the ones who are above median of overall attractiveness rating
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Table 2.4: Tabulation of Client’s Ethnicity by Sex Worker’s Country of Origin
Country
Ethnicity China Thailand Vietnam Indonesia SingIndian* Total
Chinese 116 92 50 35 3 296
JapaneseKorean 11 25 13 7 0 56
Caucasian 46 25 24 11 1 107
Middle Eastern 10 10 15 1 0 36
Indian 28 32 7 8 11 86
Malay 30 17 10 2 1 60
Bangladesh 51 62 25 18 11 167
Total 292 263 144 82 27 808
Chinese 39.2% 31.1% 16.9% 11.8% 1.0% 100.0%
JapaneseKorean 19.6% 44.6% 23.2% 12.5% 0.0% 100.0%
Caucasian 43.0% 23.4% 22.4% 10.3% 0.9% 100.0%
Middle Eastern 27.8% 27.8% 41.7% 2.8% 0.0% 100.0%
Indian 32.6% 37.2% 8.1% 9.3% 12.8% 100.0%
Malay 50.0% 28.3% 16.7% 3.3% 1.7% 100.0%
Bangladesh 30.5% 37.1% 15.0% 10.8% 6.6% 100.0%
Total 36.1% 32.5% 17.8% 10.1% 3.3% 100.0%
Chinese 39.7% 35.0% 34.7% 42.7% 11.1% 36.6%
JapaneseKorean 3.8% 9.5% 9.0% 8.5% 0.0% 6.9%
Caucasian 15.8% 9.5% 16.7% 13.4% 3.7% 13.2%
Middle Eastern 3.4% 3.8% 10.4% 1.2% 0.0% 4.5%
Indian 9.6% 12.2% 4.9% 9.8% 40.7% 10.6%
Malay 10.3% 6.5% 6.9% 2.4% 3.7% 7.4%
Bangladesh 17.5% 23.6% 17.4% 22.0% 40.7% 20.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
* SingIndian are the Singaporean Indian sex workers, who typically have dark skin tone
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Table 2.5: Sex Worker’s Characteristics (1/2)
No. Col %
Country
Thailand 58 32.8
China 59 33.3
Vietnam 38 21.5
Indonesia 16 9.0
Singapore 6 3.4
Education
Illiterate 37 21.0
Primary 90 51.1
Secondary 36 20.5
High School 10 5.7
College 3 1.7
Marital Status
Single 119 67.2
Married 20 11.3
Divorced 35 19.8
Widow 3 1.7
Urban
Rural 113 64.6
Urban 62 35.4
Child
No 136 76.8
Yes 41 23.2
Total 177 100.0
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Table 2.6: Sex Worker’s Characteristics (2/2)
Mean Std. Err.
Age 26.35 3.91
Working Days a Week 6.36 1.14
Workhours (Weekday) 9.14 2.16
Workhours (Weekend) 11.38 3.26
Clients per day 3.87 1.68
Years of Experience 2.92 1.92
Years of Experience (Singapore) 1.69 1.31
Income in Singapore (S$) 3202 1220
Income at Home (S$) 450 344
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Table 2.7: Client’s Characteristics
No. Col %
Ethnicity
Chinese 296 36.6
JapaneseKorean 56 6.9
Caucasian 107 13.2
Middle Eastern 36 4.5
Indian 86 10.6
Malay 60 7.4
Bangladesh 167 20.7
Outfit (Better than Middle Rating*)
No 412 50.8
Yes 346 42.7
Attractive (Better than Middle Rating)
No 409 50.4
Yes 380 46.9
Sweet Talk (Better than Middle Rating)
No 499 61.5
Yes 312 38.5
Regular
No 600 80.5
Yes 143 19.2
Tourist
No 529 70.8
Yes 218 29.2
Total 805 100.0
* Better than Middle rating means the rating the sex worker gives to a client is high than the
median rating.
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Table 2.8: Summary of Three Regressions
First Move Inital Price Bargain Fail
Probit Logit FE OLS FE RE Probit Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ethnicity (Base=Chinese)
Caucasian 0.166∗∗ 1.492∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ -0.042 -1.589
(0.084) (0.757) (0.053) (0.040) (0.040) (0.071) (1.415)
Bangladesh -0.067 -0.951∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 2.325∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.432) (0.048) (0.038) (0.038) (0.052) (0.783)
Indian -0.228∗∗∗ -1.730∗∗∗ -0.075 0.017 -0.016 0.162∗∗∗ 2.237∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.453) (0.047) (0.036) (0.037) (0.047) (0.761)
Malay -0.091 -1.039∗∗ -0.001 -0.045 -0.053 0.220∗∗∗ 3.328∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.518) (0.057) (0.044) (0.044) (0.054) (0.858)
Japanese/Korean 0.012 0.409 0.048 0.087∗ 0.082∗ -0.049 -1.825
(0.093) (0.732) (0.064) (0.048) (0.048) (0.092) (1.608)
Middle Eastern 0.027 0.512 0.074 0.144∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.000 -13.762
(0.138) (0.977) (0.090) (0.067) (0.068) (.) (1110.277)
Dress (Above Middle Rating) 0.004 0.137 0.082∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.069∗∗ -0.051 -0.564
(0.050) (0.432) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.047) (0.762)
Attractiveness (Above Median Rating) 0.173∗∗∗ 0.170 -0.027 0.007 -0.006 -0.015 0.227
(0.058) (0.443) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033) (0.049) (0.690)
Sweettalk (Above Median Rating) 0.059∗∗ 0.009 0.021 -0.019 -0.168
(0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.416)
Age(Client) -0.002 -0.025 0.001 0.004∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.034)
Age Square(Sex Client) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Regular Clients -0.031 -0.034 0.065∗ 0.020 0.035 -0.127∗∗ -1.535∗
(0.052) (0.322) (0.037) (0.028) (0.028) (0.062) (0.889)
Tourist 0.018 0.047 0.086∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.029 1.155
(0.045) (0.532) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (1.119)
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price;
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Table 2.9: Summary of Three Regressions (cont)
First Move Inital Price Bargain Fail
Probit Logit FE OLS FE RE Probit Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sex Worker’s Characteristics
Age(Sex Worker) 0.009 0.001 0.008
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Age Square(Sex Worker) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Experience -0.025∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.017∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Experience Square 0.004 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.022 0.127∗∗∗ 0.058
(0.053) (0.036) (0.038)
Education (Above Median Rating) -0.190∗∗∗ -0.012 0.003
(0.049) (0.035) (0.039)
Beauty (Above Median Rating) 0.014 0.157∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.040) (0.028) (0.031)
Englishskill (Above Median Rating) 0.024 -0.025 -0.035
(0.082) (0.055) (0.063)
Sex Worker’s BargainSkill (Above Median Rating) -0.031 -0.499
(0.031) (0.494)
Observations 604 473 604 604 604 591 330
Group 130 130 130 67
Likelihood -308.282 -154.573 -86.972 225.683 -180.215 -70.238
R2 Within 0.463 0.518
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price;
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Table 2.10: Summary of Estimates by Sex Worker’s
Beauty
All Sex Worke’s Beauty Rating
More Beautiful Less Beautiful
Client’s Ethnicity (Base=Chinese) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Probit on First Move
Caucasian 0.166∗∗ -0.045 0.276∗∗
(0.084) (0.161) (0.111)
Bangladeshi -0.067 -0.235∗ -0.030
(0.067) (0.141) (0.076)
Indian -0.228∗∗∗ -0.235∗ -0.242∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.139) (0.069)
Malay -0.091 -0.246 -0.068
(0.077) (0.172) (0.084)
Observations 604 179 425
Likelihood -308.282 -90.741 -202.112
Panel B: Fixed Effect on Initial Price
Caucasian 0.164∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.082) (0.048)
Bangladeshi -0.202∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.072) (0.046)
Indian 0.017 0.172∗∗ -0.034
(0.036) (0.073) (0.043)
Malay -0.045 0.057 -0.071
(0.044) (0.086) (0.052)
Observations 604 179 425
R2 Within 0.518 0.600 0.507
Panel C: Probit on Bargain Fail
Caucasian -0.042 0.000 -0.050
(0.071) (.) (0.081)
Bangladeshi 0.181∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.126) (0.064)
Indian 0.162∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.047) (0.101) (0.061)
Malay 0.220∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.121) (0.067)
Observations 591 142 397
Likelihood -180.215 -41.434 -125.457
Standard errors in parentheses
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Check for Statistical Discrimination
Initial Price Regression with Service Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Orginal Full Sample Added Duration Added Sexual Acts Added Service Chara Sample Bias Test Sample Bias Test
Ethnicity (Base=Chinese)
Caucasian 0.164∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.074 0.186∗∗∗ 0.037 0.120∗∗ 0.030
(0.040) (0.033) (0.059) (0.040) (0.074) (0.058) (0.069)
Bangladeshi -0.202∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.048) (0.040) (0.051) (0.047) (0.049)
Indian 0.017 -0.012 0.001 0.025 -0.000 -0.004 -0.032
(0.036) (0.035) (0.045) (0.036) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049)
Malay -0.045 -0.022 -0.071 -0.024 -0.008 -0.091 -0.078
(0.044) (0.040) (0.058) (0.045) (0.064) (0.059) (0.065)
Service Duration(log) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.030) (0.034)
Viginal -0.120∗∗∗ -0.125
(0.034) (0.236)
Oralsex 0.060∗ 0.030
(0.034) (0.041)
Anal 0.107 0.014
(0.160) (0.282)
ViginalsAnal -0.021 0.081
(0.165) (0.287)
OralAnal 0.001 0.006
(0.043) (0.050)
Weekend 0.026
(0.022)
Motel 0.082∗
(0.043)
Car 0.222∗
(0.134)
Client’s House 0.064
(0.044)
Weekend 0.026
(0.021)
Observations 604 720 422 604 405 422 405
R2 Within 0.518 0.458 0.546 0.545 0.587 0.530 0.533
Standard errors in parentheses
Other types of combinations are not shown because they are dropped due to colinearity in regression
80
Table 2.12: Robustness Check for Taste Discrimination
Original Added Sex Type Added Duration Added Bargain Time Added Serv Char
Client’s Ethnicity (Base=Indian) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probit on First Move
Chinese 0.228∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.064) (0.074) (0.079) (0.095)
Bangladeshi 0.162∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.090) (0.089) (0.103)
Caucasian 0.395∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.089) (0.111) (0.100) (0.129)
Malay 0.138∗ 0.160∗ 0.201∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.228∗
(0.082) (0.083) (0.109) (0.104) (0.125)
Observations 604 604 422 460 364
Likelihood -308.282 -303.944 -203.285 -211.255 -167.636
Panel B: Fixed Effect on Initial Price
Chinese -0.017 -0.025 -0.001 0.046 0.065
(0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.041) (0.046)
Bangladeshi -0.218∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.052) (0.043) (0.048)
Caucasian 0.147∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.073 0.173∗∗∗ 0.099∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.061) (0.050) (0.059)
Malay -0.061 -0.049 -0.072 -0.036 0.041
(0.046) (0.045) (0.063) (0.049) (0.059)
Bargain Time 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 604 604 422 463 367
R2 Within 0.518 0.545 0.546 0.657 0.708
Standard errors in parentheses
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price.
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Table 2.13: Robustness Check for Taste Discrimination (Beautiful Subsample)
Original Added Sex Type Added Duration Added Bargain Time Added Serv Char
Client’s Ethnicity (Base=Indian) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probit on First Move
Chinese 0.235∗ 0.180 0.653∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗ 0.411
(0.139) (0.145) (0.199) (0.262) (0.312)
Bangladeshi 0.000 0.002 0.480∗∗ 0.457 0.249
(0.146) (0.152) (0.221) (0.336) (0.364)
Caucasian 0.190 0.127 0.021 0.700∗∗ 0.055
(0.178) (0.189) (0.261) (0.306) (0.442)
Malay -0.010 -0.003 0.329 0.244
(0.191) (0.196) (0.313) (0.345)
Observations 179 176 119 119 79
Likelihood -90.741 -89.172 -45.839 -37.928 -29.969
Panel B: Fixed Effect on Initial Price
Chinese -0.172∗∗ -0.170∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.167∗ -0.131
(0.073) (0.076) (0.101) (0.098) (0.111)
Bangladeshi -0.388∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.739∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗
(0.075) (0.076) (0.123) (0.115) (0.129)
Caucasian 0.029 0.060 0.022 0.039 -0.154
(0.091) (0.094) (0.126) (0.116) (0.128)
Malay -0.116 -0.119 -0.220 -0.176 0.319
(0.098) (0.097) (0.148) (0.129) (0.236)
Bargain Time 0.027∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
Observations 179 179 119 125 92
R2 Within 0.600 0.627 0.732 0.783 0.867
Standard errors in parentheses
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price.
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Table 2.14: Robustness Check for Taste Discrimination (Less Beautiful Subsample)
Original Added Sex Type Added Duration Added Bargain Time Added Serv Char
Client’s Ethnicity (Base=Indian) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probit on First Move
Chinese 0.242∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.077) (0.086) (0.102)
Bangladeshi 0.211∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.077) (0.080) (0.094) (0.096) (0.110)
Caucasian 0.517∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.112) (0.144) (0.122) (0.169)
Malay 0.174∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.177 0.264∗∗ 0.309∗∗
(0.088) (0.089) (0.117) (0.113) (0.129)
Observations 425 424 303 338 267
Likelihood -202.112 -197.061 -136.624 -146.420 -114.624
Panel B: Fixed Effect on Initial Price
Chinese 0.034 0.023 0.064 0.120∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.043) (0.042) (0.050) (0.048) (0.052)
Bangladeshi -0.149∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.097∗∗ -0.039
(0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.048) (0.053)
Caucasian 0.194∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.026 0.133∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(0.053) (0.054) (0.073) (0.060) (0.067)
Malay -0.037 -0.021 -0.001 0.006 0.059
(0.053) (0.053) (0.071) (0.055) (0.064)
Bargain Time 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 425 425 303 338 275
R2 Within 0.507 0.538 0.537 0.646 0.694
Standard errors in parentheses
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price.
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Table 2.15: Summary of Estimates with Addtional Controls
First Move Initial Price Bargain Fail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Client’s Ethnicity ((Base=Chinese)
Caucasian 0.166∗∗ 0.133 0.045 0.164∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ -0.042 0.012
(0.084) (0.101) (0.188) (0.040) (0.048) (0.071) (0.104)
Bangladeshi -0.067 -0.072 -0.144∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.081) (0.075) (0.038) (0.044) (0.052) (0.074)
Indian -0.228∗∗∗ -0.146∗ -0.307∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.002 0.162∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.082) (0.076) (0.036) (0.046) (0.047) (0.074)
Malay -0.091 -0.098 -0.167∗ -0.045 -0.024 0.220∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.106) (0.086) (0.044) (0.059) (0.054) (0.084)
Client’s Ethnicity (Base=Chinese)*TransactionDay (Base=Weekday(Mon-Thur))
Weekend -0.030 0.023 0.156∗∗
(0.058) (0.031) (0.068)
Caucasian*Weekend 0.087 0.015 -0.112
(0.136) (0.055) (0.129)
Bangladeshi*Weekend -0.058 -0.026 -0.149
(0.141) (0.079) (0.105)
Indian*Weekend -0.229∗ 0.048 -0.079
(0.122) (0.068) (0.095)
Malay*Weekend -0.058 -0.026 -0.149
(0.141) (0.079) (0.105)
Attractive=1 0.173∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.094 0.007 0.012 -0.015 -0.019
(0.058) (0.058) (0.070) (0.033) (0.034) (0.049) (0.051)
Client’s Ethnicity (Base=Chinese)*Client’s Attractiveness (Base=Below Median Rating)
Caucasian*Attractive=Above Median 0.145
(0.195)
Bangladeshi*Attractive=Above Median 0.000
(.)
Indian*Attractive=Above Median 0.242∗
(0.138)
Malay*Attractive=Above Median 0.000
(.)
Observations 604 587 591 604 591 591 563
Likelihood -308.282 -298.799 -302.192 225.683 220.989 -180.215 -174.376
R2 Within - - - 0.518 0.523
Standard errors in parentheses
All regressions based on the transactions where sex workers initiate price.
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Table 2.16: OLS Regression on Initial Price
(Clients Initiate Price)
(1)
Log Initial Price
Ethnicity (Base=Chinese)
Caucasian 0.344∗
(0.197)
Bangladesh -0.309∗∗
(0.135)
Indian -0.156
(0.130)
Malay 0.113
(0.104)
Japanese/Korean -0.229
(0.188)
Middle Eastern 0.666∗∗∗
(0.133)
Dress(Above Median Rating) 0.354∗∗∗
(0.114)
Attractiveness(Above Median Rating) 0.104
(0.105)
Age(Client) -0.002
(0.006)
Age Square(Sex Client) 0.000
(0.000)
Regular Clients 0.182∗∗
(0.089)
Tourist -0.002
(0.004)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.17: OLS Regression on Initial Price
(Clients Initiate Price) Cont
(1)
Log Initial Price
Sex Worker’s Characteristics)
Country(Base=Chinese)
Thailand -0.110
(0.087)
Vietnam -0.020
(0.098)
Indonesia -0.347∗∗∗
(0.131)
SingaporeanIndian -0.531∗
(0.269)
Age(Sex Worker) 0.033∗∗
(0.013)
Age Square(Sex Worker) -0.001
(0.002)
Experience -0.028
(0.028)
Experience Square 0.006
(0.010)
Beauty(Above Median Rating) 0.153
(0.093)
firstmoveG==1 -0.037
(0.085)
Constant 3.858∗∗∗
(0.125)
Observations 112
R2 0.786
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.18: Final Price and Discount (1/2)
Final Price DIscount
OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Client’s Characteristics
Ethnicity (Base=Chinese)
Japanese/Korean -0.033 -0.022 2.689 1.932
(0.043) (0.043) (3.356) (3.370)
Caucasian -0.026 0.029 2.069 -2.399
(0.036) (0.038) (2.821) (3.002)
Middle Eastern -0.047 0.011 2.244 -2.381
(0.050) (0.050) (3.927) (3.888)
Indian -0.036 0.004 2.666 -0.297
(0.029) (0.029) (2.235) (2.297)
Malay -0.051 -0.062∗ 4.491∗ 5.281∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (2.583) (2.610)
Bangladesh -0.035 -0.044 3.451 4.116∗
(0.028) (0.030) (2.200) (2.322)
Dress (Above Median Rating) 0.013 0.028 -0.964 -2.217
(0.020) (0.022) (1.599) (1.737)
Attractiveness (Above Median Rating) -0.030 -0.041∗ 2.804 3.711∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (1.750) (1.886)
Sweettalk (Above Median Rating) -0.036∗∗ -0.037∗∗ 2.730∗∗ 2.916∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (1.110) (1.151)
Log Initial Price 0.974∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 2.938 16.158∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.039) (2.039) (3.044)
Age(Client) -0.002∗ 0.000 0.195∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.099) (0.099)
Age Square(Sex Client) 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006)
Repeat Clients 0.031 0.034∗ -2.918∗ -3.040∗
(0.021) (0.020) (1.605) (1.582)
Tourist 0.039 0.023 -2.895 -1.939
(0.030) (0.032) (2.348) (2.480)
Bargain Time -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.150) (0.153)
Observations 463 463 463 463
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.19: Final Price and Discount (2/2)
Final Price DIscount
OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Worker’s Characteristics
Age(Sex Worker) 0.003 -0.296
(0.003) (0.233)
Age Square(Sex Worker) -0.000 0.026
(0.000) (0.027)
Experience -0.007 0.611
(0.005) (0.421)
Experience Square 0.000 -0.009
(0.001) (0.067)
Thailand -0.002 0.089
(0.017) (1.338)
Vietnam 0.041 -3.283
(0.027) (2.099)
Indonesia 0.012 -1.054
(0.024) (1.899)
SingaporeanIndian -0.032 3.303
(0.040) (3.133)
Married 0.048∗∗ -4.184∗∗∗
(0.020) (1.584)
Education(Above Median Rating) 0.055∗∗∗ -4.619∗∗∗
(0.019) (1.465)
Beauty (Above Median Rating) -0.001 -0.432
(0.017) (1.306)
English Skill(Above Median Rating) 0.107∗∗∗ -8.596∗∗∗
(0.033) (2.549)
Sex worker’s BargainSkill(Above Median Rating) 0.118∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ -9.772∗∗∗ -6.718∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (1.300) (1.571)
Constant -0.051 0.679∗∗∗ 0.848 -59.554∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.162) (8.550) (12.647)
Observations 463 463 463 463
R2 Within 0.878 0.801 0.425 0.500
R2 Between 0.884 0.023
R2 Overall 0.851 0.232
Standard errors in parentheses
Chapter 3
The Impact of Information Structure on Bargaining
Outcome
3.1 Introduction
“Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts”- Baker and Holmstrom [1995]
There is a scarce supply of empirical facts compared to an abundant supply of theoretical works
about the internal labor market, as highlighted by Baker and Holmstrom [1995] and restated by
Smeets and Warzynski [2008]. This statement applies to the literature on bargaining as well. As
mentioned in Rubinstein [1995], "the link between economic theory and practical problems, such
as how to bargain, is tenuous at best." This statement still holds true today.
Bargaining occurs when parties hold conflicting interests in a negotiation and it persists as infor-
mation gets less complete or symmetric. It is a common method of completing a trade or economic
settlement, especially in free market exchanges where fixed price market mechanisms are lacking
and small businesses traders are ubiquitous. There is an abundant amount of theoretical work on
bargaining. This paper aims to shed some light on how information structures influence bargaining
outcomes and establish regularities at different levels of information imperfection.
With complete information, offers are always expected to be accepted immediately, whether it is a
“take-it or leave-it” offer or alternating offer bargaining. There is a vast literature on strategic mod-
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els of bargaining of one-sided incomplete information. Harsanyi and Selten [1972] and Myerson
and Satterthwaite [1983] are the pioneers who extended Nash’s axiomatic model with incomplete
information. Bargaining impasses or delays in agreement occur when the incomplete information
is introduced into the models. However, no generalized characterization of equilibrium has been
discovered with two-sided incomplete information (Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], Fudenberg and
Levine [1985]). Little has been done to formally characterize the difference between bargaining
outcomes under different degrees of information incompleteness. A widely agreed consensus is
that delay in responding to offers is a rational equilibrium strategy when the information is lacking.
In the alternating offer model, delay in agreement can be regarded as a screening process in which
the agents take time to learn about each other’s private information before the settlement [Gul and
Sonnenschein, 1988]. It is also regarded as a tool to signal the strength in bargaining position
[Cramton, 1992].
Relatively fewer empirical studies pertaining to bargaining can be found in the literature. Bargain-
ing, particularly on the individual level, is carried out privately involving intricate dynamics over a
very short period of time, which makes it very challenging for researchers to observe and collect
data. This hinders researchers from obtaining sufficient information to set the parameters in the
structural estimation or perform reduce form estimations. There are many studies about bargaining
between organizations (i.e. between unions and corporations). I will not discuss these here, as my
interest is individual level bargaining.
Lab experiments have been a popular alternative tool to test theory predictions and to offer in-
sights about the true nature of real world bargaining. Some well-known lab experiment are Roth,
Murnighan, and Schoumaker [1988] 1, Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren [2002] and Forsythe, Ken-
nan, and Sopher [1991]2. Nevertheless, lab experiments are critiqued for the endogeneity problem.
Outside of the labs, most of the empirical studies demonstrate how incompleteness of information
1It examines the deadline effect on the acceptance of offers
2It is a lab experiment on one-sided private information and it found that common knowledge assumptions do not
hold in the experiment
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in the market will alter the agents’ bargaining strategies. Castillo et al. [2013] is an interesting field
experiment on taxi fare pricing and bargaining in Lima. The authors found that taxi drivers use the
gender of clients as a signal of willingness to pay in order to set the rate and to bargain. Grennan
[2013] studied how clients of male sex workers use the sex workers’ online profile pictures as
signals to predict the quality of the sex workers. This study showed that richer information will
alleviate the negative externalities generated from asymmetric information.
Others have paid attention to bargaining outcomes and the welfare effects of bargaining. Goldreich
and Pomorski [2011] uses poker tournament data and rigorously explores the core questions regard-
ing bargaining: when it occurs, who initiates it, and how the outcome of bargaining depends on
the characteristics of the initiator. Keniston [2011] used auto-rickshaw bargaining data collected in
India and performed a dynamic structural estimation to show the welfare effects of bargaining. He
found that about 68% of buyers prefer to stay in the bargaining market despite the fact that overall
welfare would be improved by 28% if they switched from bargaining to a fixed price system.
In this paper, I look into the sex trade where bargaining is an inherent nature of business. My data
is collected in the illegal commercial sex market in Singapore, which consists of transactions on
the street level and in nightclubs. It not only contains information on bargain structure but also
various measures of bargaining outcomes.
In section 3.2, I unravel the bargaining dynamics in the commercial sex market and identify infor-
mation structure scenarios in this special market setting. Then, I move to the description of the my
data in section 3.3. Empirical estimation and analysis are presented in section 3.4 and section 3.5.
Lastly, I conclude in section 3.6.
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3.2 Bargaining in Commercial Sex Market in Singapore
3.2.1 Bargaining Environment
The study focuses on the illegal sex workers in the red light district, Geylang Street, and the en-
tertainers in the nightclubs, the high-end district in Singapore. Both areas are very competitive
markets. However, they are not direct competitors because they are targeting very different de-
mands and the services they provide are not substitutable. In both venues the bargaining dynamics
share similarities as well as differences.
In the Geylang district, sex workers specialize in selling sexual services alone. Sex workers on
the street spread out across the even lanes in the red light district. They are freelancers, except
for the ones who are controlled by a pimp in a particular lane. Pimps provide security services to
safeguard the sex workers against rough clients and police patrols. A pimp’s dominant power over
the lane also keeps the potential entrants out, which in turn prevents the profit margin from falling
because of surplus in supply.
In the nightclubs, sex workers are the entertainers (i.e. the singers, dancers and hostess) hired by
the nightclubs under legal working permits. Taking advantage of the nightclubs as platforms, they
privately sell sexual services to earn additional income. In that sense, they are self-employed sex
workers. A comprehensive review of the commercial sex market in Singapore can be found in my
institution paper on this market (see Li, 2014).
In both the street and nightclub segments, the sex trade negotiations involve two parties: sex work-
ers as sellers and clients as buyers3. On the street, the trade is realized immediately after a success-
ful negotiation. In the nightclub, trades may be executed either immediately or after the sex workers
get off from work. There is no enforcement mechanism in place to reinforce the verbal contracts,
so sex workers in the nightclub are vulnerable to the breach of contracts from clients. However, it
3In the nightclubs, there are managers who often step in and negotiate prices for the sex workers. My sample only
includes the transactions where sex workers negotiate for themselves
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is not apparent that this possibility has any substantial impact on the bargaining interactions in the
nightclubs.
3.2.2 Determinants of Bargaining Outcomes
Under complete information, equilibrium can be determined by factors like bargainer’s time pref-
erence, time between the offers and who initiates the offer (Rubinstein [1982] etc.).The equilibrium
of bargaining outcomes can change and complicate dramatically when there is private information.
Bargaining efficiency is defined by how quickly the bargain is concluded, whether an agreement is
reached and whether it is a mutually beneficial one, as well as how the gain is split. In this bilateral
monopoly bargaining over the trading of a sexual service, the transaction is efficient if the service
is traded whenever the clients’ pay exceeds sex worker’s reservation price.
The objective of this paper concerns the mapping of uncertainty to bargaining outcomes. Therefore,
I will start with a discussion on the information structure in this commercial sex market, then review
minor factors like time preference and who initiates the price.
3.2.2.1 Information Structure
Because of the underground nature of the business and the intimate nature of the service, infor-
mation asymmetry and incompleteness is pervasive in illegal commercial sex markets. Based on
our interviews, negotiations between sex workers and clients in the sex market concentrate on the
price of service, not the context of the service. The issue of incomplete information becomes more
pertinent when the bargainers have private information on the valuation of the service and proba-
bilistic information concerning their adversary’s valuation. First, it is necessary to first identify the
information structure scenarios.
Two-sided Good Information - Repeat Clients
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The two-sided good imperfect information case can be well approximated by the transactions where
sex workers engage with their repeat customers. Iterative interactions allow both sex workers and
customers to learn about each other’s valuation of the service. Sex workers will have a better
assessment of client’s minimum willingness to pay. Clients could also adjust his beliefs about the
sex worker’s reservation price. Regardless of the identity of the initiator, these initial prices are the
signals of the historic transactions they have had and they may better resemble the price at which
both parties are willing to trade.
Sometimes, sex workers or clients can discover better information in other ways. There are times
when clients seek out sex workers via their personal contacts with pimps. Some of these clients
will directly reveal their willingness to pay to pimps and then rely on pimps to find a match for
them. Under these circumstances, the intermediary greatly reduces the uncertainty between sex
workers and clients, and the proposed offers are expected to be accepted right way. I do not have
information on the pimps’ involvement in bargaining, hence I will focus on transactions between
sex workers and repeat clients.
One-sided Incomplete Information - Local Clients
Sex workers’ interactions with local clients represent the case of one-sided imperfect information.
As a local, the client has various channels through which to learn about the markets. Geylang is
a popular and much sought after dining destination. Locals can learn about the demographics of
the sex worker population by walking around on Geylang street or visiting nightclubs. Internet
forums are another easy way to obtain general pricing and trade information on both the street and
nightclub venues. On the other hand, sex workers also assimilate substantial information about
local clients given their big presence in the customer pool. Even though private information on
the local clients’ valuation is not directly available to sex workers, they can partially learn about
it through past interactions with local clients. Even to a newcomer on the street, she is still able
to acquire preference of the clients from the local pimps. The knowledge sex workers have about
locals is abundant but not complete.
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Two-sided Imperfect Information - Tourist
When interacting with tourists, sex workers are much less informed about the clients’ preferences,
but the workers are also aware that the tourists’ market knowledge is tenuous. When tourists decide
to trade in a foreign market, they are taking a gamble. In comparison with the previous two cases,
in this example the presence of incomplete and asymmetric information is extreme, a condition
which can be best described as two-sided incomplete information.
A more informed bargainer possesses a less spread belief function about their opponent’s valua-
tion. In the latter two cases, sex workers and the clients are expected to learn more about each
other through negotiation. A seller is in a weak bargaining position if matched to a low valuation
opponent, and vice versa. The distribution of each player’s valuation can be a function of a set of
signals when information is lacking. For example, sex workers take a client’s attractiveness and
outfit as signals to assess their willingness to pay, whereas the clients will use the sex worker’s
beauty and physical figure to infer her reservation value. The role of signals will be discussed later
in the analysis section.
3.2.2.2 Bargainer’s Time Preference
In the literature on bargaining, the bargainer’s time preference is modeled as the discounting factor
in their utility function. It is often interpreted as how impatient players are in receiving the payoff.
Equilibrium behaviors of the bargainers entail the tradeoffs between the expected profitability of
the trade and the probability of reaching agreement of a trade. The parameters of a bargainers’
time preference hinge on both exogenous and endogenous factors in the sex trade. The exogenous
factors are the bargaining environment and shocks on demand; the endogenous factor is the sex
worker’s wealth level.
Street v.s Nightclub
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Bargaining raises transaction costs for both clients and sex workers and reduces trade volume for
the latter. Because they face intense competition, sex workers have incentives to avoid bargaining
altogether or to minimize the bargaining duration. Clients also have incentives to close the deal
quickly because they incur disutility when they postpone consuming the service and bargaining is
time consuming. Therefore, both players are incentivized to circumvent bargaining. This dynamic
is expected to be more pronounced for street sex workers compared to sex workers in the nightclubs.
Geylang Street and the nightclubs are very different bargaining environments. The venue can
be regarded as a strong indicator of the player’s discounting factor. On the street, bargainers,
especially sex workers, are more inpatient because negotiation takes place in public where police
patrol is tight. Nightclubs are entertainment establishments, so they provide a safe environment
for negotiation. Both bargainers are expected to be more patient. This is especially true for sex
workers working in nightclubs, because selling sex is not their sole income source. Thus, I expect
bargaining outcomes, in particular the bargaining time, will differ across venues. A simple t-test has
shown that bargaining time on the street is -0.56 (statistically significant) of a minute shorter than
that in nightclubs. The difference is even higher at -0.80 (statistically significant) for transactions
with sex workers initiating the offer.
Demand Shock
In both venues, the sex trade business faces similar demand fluctuations with Friday, Saturday and
Sunday being the peak days of the week. Sex workers heavily rely on the peak days to generate
revenues. Clients may take longer to find a match on peak days. Movement in demand directly
determine the sex workers’ trading volume. Depending on the trading volumes prior to negotiation,
a sex worker’s time preference may change.
Sex Worker’s Wealth
Economic agents behave differently depending on their level of wealth endowment. The sex
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worker’s monthly income can be viewed as a form of wealth endowment. Sex workers with more
wealth may exhibit different bargaining behaviors than the ones with less wealth. I study this dy-
namic by adding sex workers’ monthly income from sex trading in regression. It is noteworthy
that sex workers’ wealth is also somehow endogenous, as their bargaining strategy may affect their
wealth accumulation.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Overview
My sample consists of transactions level data from both Geylang Street and nightclubs (see Table
3.1). There are 324 sex workers and 1574 transactions in total. The street sample is comprised of
177 sex workers and 817 transactions, while the nightclub sample consists of 147 sex workers and
757 transactions. Both the sex worker and client samples are comprised of individuals with diverse
backgrounds. I find that Chinese, Thai, Vietnamese, Indonesian and Singaporean-Indian women
dominate the streets market. In the nightclubs, I have observed even a greater variety of ethnic
composition. In addition to the aforementioned ethnicities, sex workers from Malaysia, Taiwan,
Philippines and Eastern Europe represent the core workforce in high-end venues.
Singapore is a multiracial society with Chinese being the largest ethnic group. They represent
around 40% of the client pool in my sample. Despite the fact that Malay is the second largest
ethnic group in Singapore, they only occupy 7% of the client sample. This could be because
Malays are mostly Muslims and their sexual behavior is more constrained by their religious beliefs.
Singapore hosts a large number of foreign workers, of which Bangladeshi male workers make up a
considerable share. They are also frequent visitors to the low-end street sex trade market, making
up one fifth of the street client sample. In addition, Caucasians are also a major client group. 20%
of club customers are Caucasians.
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Sex workers on average earn S$3100 a month, though sex workers from nightclubs also receive
additional legal income from the formal sector. The average price of a transaction is S$70 on the
street, which is three times less than the price in the high-end market.
Client type is used as a proxy for information structure between the bargainers. Here, I want to
describe this important variable. For both venues, repeat clients and non-repeating local clients
together represent 20% of the client sample. 76% of repeat clients are Chinese and 10% are Cau-
casians. All the non-repeating local clients are Chinese. The tourist group is more diverse with
50% Caucasians, 20% Japanese or Korean, and 12% Indians or other ethnicities. Tourists comprise
40% of the nightclub sample, whereas only one quarter of street sample are tourists. As previously
mentioned, the sex trade clients on the street who are foreign workers are mostly Bangladeshi
construction workers. However, the composition of the foreign workers in the nightclubs is more
diverse and does not include any Bangladeshi construction workers (see Table 3.3). Since night-
clubs attract an upper tier of the demand, it is not surprising to observe that 60% of the club clients
are rated as very attractive, whereas only 33% of street clients fall into the same category. Similarly,
44% of nightclub clients are considered well-dressed and only 18% of street clients are regarded
as well-dressed.
At the individual level, detailed characteristics of sex workers are recorded, which include age,
beauty, figure4, years of experience, education, marital status and country of origin. Key traits like
ethnicity and age of clients, whether the client is a regular client or tourist, the client’s attractive-
ness5 and how well they are dressed are also collected.
A major advantage of this data is its moderately rich records on the bargaining process. In the
survey, I gathered information on which party initiates a trade, who makes the first offer, whether
the bargain fails or succeeds and the bargaining skills of both clients and sex workers6. I believe
that both take-or-leave-it offers and alternating offer bargaining are employed interchangeably in
4Beauty and figure of the sex workers are rated by the enumerators in the eyes of clients.
5Attractiveness of the client and how well they are dressed are rated by the sex workers
6We have asked sex workers to rate their own and their clients’ bargaining skills. This information is not used for
empirical analysis, as I am worried that it would be endogenously influenced by the bargaining outcome
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sex trade. However, detailed bargaining dynamics (i.e. how often these protocols are used and how
long the player waited to make a counteroffer) are not available in my data.
3.3.2 Bargainers’ Strategy
Uncertainty directly alters bargainers’ strategies. These strategies include whether a bargainer is
the first to approach the other party, who initiates the offer and the initial price proposed. Here, I
briefly discuss the observed relationship between uncertainty and bargainers’ strategies.
Identity of First Mover
Generally speaking, sex workers are slightly more likely to approach the clients than vice versa
(see Table 3.4). 64% of the time, sex workers are the first ones to initiate contact. This first move
tendency is very different on the street as compared to the nightclubs. Sex workers in the club more
actively approach clients because the uncertainty is low. Sex workers initiate the first approach to
repeat clients 86% of the time, which is 20% higher than their rate of first approach to non-repeating
locals and nearly twice as high than their rate of first approach to tourists (47%). In contrast, street
sex workers are more likely to approach tourists (81%) than their repeat clients (68%).
Identity of Initiator
In the absence of private information, players trade to gain, which should be independent of who
initiates the offer. Under a private information scenario, neither the characteristics of the initiator
nor their relation to uncertainty are unanimously and clearly identified in the bargaining literature.
Sex workers face a highly diverse client group and there is great heterogeneity in clients’ valuations
of the service. Most often, sex workers are the parties who first approach the buyers and are the
first to initiate the price. 81% of the transactions start with sex workers proposing the price. This
likelihood persists across all degrees of the uncertainty.
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The sex workers’ proactivity in price proposals could be due to market competition. Market expe-
rience differs a lot between sex workers and the clients. The initial prices proposed by sex workers
and the clients are expected to contain very different sets of information. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to examine the bargaining dynamics from sex worker initiated cases and client initiated cases
separately. Since most of these transactions are initiated by the sex workers, the emphasis will be
placed on this sample in later analysis.
Initial Offer Price
Bargainers take a critical action when they offer an initial price. By making the first offer, players
may reveal his/her time preference and valuation of object. It may also reflect how informed the
initiator is about the adversary’s reservation price. In the street transactions, the initial price offered
by sex workers is always the highest when there is strong presence of uncertainty (see Table 3.5).
T-test shows that sex workers and clients in nightclubs follow uniform pricing strategy regardless
of uncertainty.
Initial prices differ significantly by the identity of initiator. In the nightclubs, conventional pricing
pattern where sellers aim high sell low and buyers aim low are practiced. Interestingly, the opposite
is found on the street.
3.4 Estimation Equations
In this section, we set up regression models and perform statistical analysis to more rigorously
assess the impact of information structures on bargaining outcomes.
Y (m)ij = α1 +βmTj + γmPij + δmVij +κmDi +φmIij +ϕmLij +σ′mG′i + η′mC′j + εij (3.1)
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I use 3 measures of bargaining outcomes, so Y (m)ij can be any one of them. The first 2 depen-
dent variables directly assess the efficiency of the bargain: Y (1)ij is whether the offer is accepted
immediately and is estimated using probit regression; Y (2)ij is duration of bargaining and is esti-
mated using quantile and tobit regressions. The third dependent variable captures the resolution of
bargaining. Y (3)ij is whether the bargain has failed and is estimated by Probit regression.
Sex workers and clients are represented by i and j, respectively; Tij is the categorical variable
identifying whether a client is a regular customer, a non-repeating local customer, a tourist or
other; Pij are the log of initial prices proposed since the initial price hints at the offer initiators’
estimation of the opponent’s valuation of service. This could potentially capture the incompleteness
information, which is supposed to be absorbed by Tij . Therefore, estimation outputs with and
without initial price controls are performed and discussed later. Vij defines the venue where the
transaction takes place; Di is whether the transaction occurs on weekdays or weekend; Iij is sex
worker’s monthly income. These three variables are added to control for the bargainers’ time
preference (if any) and other differences caused by exogenous and endogenous factors.
Lij stands for no language barrier. Language barriers may indirectly change the bargaining duration
(i.e. longer bargaining duration with tourists and foreign workers could be caused by the language
barriers). By controlling for this, I remove the factors that may blur the effect of information
structure on bargaining outcome.
In the absence of perfect information, signal becomes critical when agents formulate strategies.
Therefore, a set of observable characteristics along with non-observable characteristics are con-
trolled in this study. G′i is the set of sex workers’ characteristics, which includes the sex worker’s
country of origin, age, years of experience, education, monthly income7, beauty8. C ′j is the set
of client characteristics, which includes the client’s age, attractiveness, how well he is dressed and
7High income earners are expected to have different behavior patterns and risk preferences than low income earners.
By controlling for this, I expect to purge these distractions.
8The attractiveness of the sex worker’s figure is not controlled as I intended, since figure and beauty are highly
correlated.
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whether he is a regular customer to the venue9. Notice that for any estimations performed for a par-
ticular venue, the rating for the sex worker’s beauty and figure, as well as the client’s attractiveness
and outfit are calculated against people in the same venue, not entire sample.
Another important measure of efficiency is the division of the gains. In the sex trade, bargainers
are not competing for a share of the pie. Rather, sex workers seek to sell above their reservation
price and clients seek to pay below their reservation value of the service. A feasible way to assess
efficiency in the split of return is by studying relative efficiency. Therefore, I run sex worker’s fixed
effects on (log) final price.
FinalPriceij = α4+β4Tj +γ4Pij +κmDi+φmIij +ϕmLij +τ4Wi+σ′4G′i+η′4C′j+μij (3.2)
3.5 Empirical Findings
Bargainers exhibit different behavior patterns. I start by examining the bargaining outcomes as
determined by the identity of initiators. Table 3.7 and Table 3.9 present the estimation on bargaining
outcomes when sex workers and clients initiate the price, respectively. Table 3.8 and Table 3.10
provide the estimations on bargaining outcomes using negotiations initiated by clients.
The variable client type measures the uncertainty bargainers have about their opponent’s valu-
ation. Recall that in the case of repeat clients, there is a good amount of two-sided informa-
tion, whereas there is some decent amount of two-sided incomplete information in transactions
with non-repeating locals and two-sided incomplete information in transactions with tourists. The
benchmark group is the tourists.
Foreign workers on the street are usually less wealthy construction workers. The foreign workers
9Knowledge about the market is also a crucial element because a regular client in the venue is expected to know
much more than a irregular local. Therefore, I control for whether or not the client is a regular in the venue.
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group in the nightclub consists of more diverse clients from different ethnic backgrounds. I have
no clear sense of what this group of clients and sex workers knows about each other’s reservation
value. Hence, I will leave this group out of discussion.
3.5.1 Bargaining Duration
The average bargaining duration is 4 minutes in nightclubs and 3 minutes on the street (see Table
3.6). This difference in duration could be explained by the following: the nightclub is a safer bar-
gaining environment; players are more patient; and clients seek fun in the nightclubs and may have
incentive to chat a bit more with sex workers. 146 negotiations (66 from street and 80 from night-
clubs) take 10 minutes to finish and 36 negotiations (16 from street and 20 from nightclubs) take
more than 10 minutes to conclude. It would not be surprising if these longer bargaining durations
are related to the less informed clients group like tourists and foreign workers. However, no evi-
dence has been found to support this hypothesis. Interestingly, every longer bargaining interaction
concluded with a successful trade. It seems impossible for mere bargaining on service price to take
so long; therefore, these prolonged bargaining interactions very likely involve discussions on mat-
ters unrelated to the trade itself. It is often reported by the sex workers that some of the clients like
to flirt and chat before purchasing the service. It also possible that the first attempt at bargaining
failed but resumed again after the bargainers return from another failed round of searching.
Since 30% of the offers are accepted without bargaining and 10% of the bargaining takes at least
10 minutes, both quantile regression and tobit regression are employed for estimation. For tobit
regression, the lower limit is set to be 0 and upper limit is set to be 10. Coefficients in column (1)
& (2) in Table 3.7 are obtained using quantile regression at median and those in column (3) & (4)
are obtained at 75 percentile.
There are a few interesting findings to highlight from this table. Foremost, information structure is
a key predictor of the bargaining duration. Bargaining concludes 1 minute faster with repeat clients
than with tourists. Contrary to our intuition, the bargaining duration is estimated to be longer with
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non-repeat locals than with tourists, despite the fact that these difference are all insignificant. This
result is mainly driven by the situation in the nightclubs. Later, I will elaborate upon this more
when I discuss the output by venues.
In addition, bargaining duration also varies with the bargainer’s time preference (proxied by vari-
able venue) and the price of initial offer. As discussed earlier, initial price varies by the identity
of initiator and the bargainer’s time preference. More importantly, it reflects the information the
initiator possesses. Information (i.e. client type) alone explains 10% of the variation in initial price.
Therefore, I have also performed the same estimation without controlling for initial price (see even
columns). When the effect of the initial price is removed, as expected, the impact of uncertainty
becomes more pronounced when comparing the bargaining duration between transactions with re-
peat clients and tourists. Hereafter, to fully demonstrate the impact of information on bargaining
outcomes, I decided to stick to the regressions specification without including initial price.
The effectiveness of the bargaining can be affected by the language used in bargaining. I have
created a variable measuring the language barriers between the bargainers using their country of
origin and ethnicities. It is roughly estimated that only about 25% negotiations are carried out
without language barriers. Moreover, transactions with locals or repeat clients do not always indi-
cate a smooth communication with no barriers because of diverse background of the sellers. Only
half of the negotiations with these two groups of clients are executed with no language difficulty.
Similarly, communication barriers turn out to be independent of bargaining outcome. Lastly, fluc-
tuation in demand (i.e. transaction day) and signal variables do not seem to influence the bargaining
duration.
Estimations of bargaining efficiency using the sample where clients initiate the price are also per-
formed and are presented in Table 3.8. The overall result is supportive of the previous conclusion
that bargaining efficiency is increased when bargainers have good information. Due to the smaller
sample size, many of the coefficients are estimated with very large standard errors. Therefore,
hereafter I will only focus on the sample where sex workers initiate there price for analysis.
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3.5.2 Immediately Acceptance and Bargain Failure
Summary statistics suggest bargaining outcomes may vary by uncertainty (see Table 3.5 Table
3.6). The repeat clients do not always receive preferential initial prices, but 42% of their bargaining
did conclude immediately after the sex workers’ initial offer and their bargain failure rate is very
low at 1%. The bargaining efficiency is relative high for repeat clients regardless of who initiates
the price and where the bargain takes place. The bargaining outcomes with non-repeating locals,
though less efficient than those with repeat clients, are much more efficient than those of the least
informed tourists group. 34% and 26% of the sex workers’ offers are accepted immediately by
non-repeating locals and 4% and 11% of those bargains fail on the street and in the nightclubs,
respectively. Similar statistics are observed for the negotiations initiated by the clients.
Table 3.9 provides the estimations for these two important bargaining outcome variables: whether
the offer is immediately accepted (column (1) & (2)) and whether the bargain fails (column (3) &
column (4). Regression outputs solidify the results revealed in the summary statistics. I have found
the sex workers’ offers are 20%-25% more likely to be accepted by a repeat client as compared
to a tourist and the bargaining is 17% less likely to fail when it is with a repeat client than with a
tourist. Notice that the bargaining failure (column (4) & column (5)) is not affected by the initial
price at all, and is conditional on information structure and other variables. This result is somewhat
expected. As long as there are opportunities for bargainers to negotiate, their true valuation of the
object will be revealed, which makes the role of initial price negligible.
3.5.3 Bargaining Outcome by Venue
As shown, the street and nightclub are very different bargaining environments in terms of police
surveillance and the nature of the business. Variable venue should capture some effect of the
bargainers’ time preference, especially that of the sex workers. We must examine results from these
venues independently to fully comprehend the relationship between uncertainty and bargaining
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outcomes, and how they both connect to the bargaining strategies.
Panel A. in Table 3.11 summarizes the coefficient estimation for variable client type from the street
sample. Bargaining efficiency is greatly improved when the presence of uncertainty diminishes.
Transactions with non-repeating locals represent a richer information case than those with tourists,
though it is thinner information than cases with repeat clients. Sex workers’ offers are 33% (13%)
more likely to be immediately accepted by repeat clients than by a non-repeating local (a tourist).
The average bargaining duration with repeat clients is almost 3 minutes, which is 2 minutes statis-
tically significant shorter than that with the locals and the tourists, respectively. Bargaining is 22%
less likely to fail when bargaining with a repeat client than a tourist. This failure rate is 11% lower
when transactions involve a non-repeat client rather than a tourist.
The bargaining dynamics observed on the street are consistent with predictions from canonical
bargaining models. Sex workers face pressure from competition and value the gain from trade
more than the clients (because their livelihood depends on the sex trade). They are not only more
active in approaching clients, but also in initiating the price. When they are less informed (i.e.
interactions with tourists), they cast a higher initial price than they would when they are very well
informed (i.e. interactions with repeat clients). As a result, bargaining under the condition of
good two-sided information always renders a quicker resolution and less failed bargaining than the
condition of two-sided incomplete information.
Panel B. shows the estimates from nightclub sample. The results are similar as to those on the
street, except that bargaining outcomes do not differ much between repeat clients and non-repeat
local clients. Both repeat and non-repeat local clients accept the sex worker’s offer 21% more often
than tourists, and the bargaining duration is 2 minutes shorter than that with tourists. Bargaining
with repeat clients is 16% less likely to fail than with tourists.
Furthermore, I find that both sex workers and clients are very selective in the nightclubs. Despite
the fact that sex workers offer similar prices to all types of clients, sex workers reveal their client
group preference (repeat clients) by approaching them much more actively. The reason why sex
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workers ask for a higher initial price when they deal with the clients they know better is actually
because they know repeat clients have purchase potential. This is consistent with fact that repeat
clients’ offers are never rejected in the nightclub as well.
3.6 Conclusion
In this article, I study negotiations in an informal market, the illegal sex trading market, where
bargainers are sex workers and clients. The purpose of the paper is to provide empirical evidence
on how different levels of information asymmetry can influence the bargaining outcomes and how
bargainers’ time preferences and the bargaining structure function in altering these outcomes.
Using the trades between sex workers and repeating clients, non-repeating locals and tourists, I
approximate different uncertainty scenarios. I find several interesting facts:
First, uncertainty matters in determining the bargaining outcomes. 30% of offers are accepted
immediately and only 12% of bargains fail. However, when uncertainty is substantially reduced,
bargaining efficiency is greatly improved. When sex workers interact with repeat clients as com-
pared to tourists, offers are 20% more likely to be accepted immediately, the bargaining duration is
1 minute shorter and 17% less likely to fail. These changes in bargaining efficiency are independent
of venue where the bargaining takes place.
Secondly, uncertainty alone explains 10% of the variance of initial price. However, whether the
bargaining is successfully concluded is independent of the initial price condition and all other
variables.
Thirdly, the seller is always more active in approaching the buyer and even more active in initiating
the price. Time of negotiation is independent of the identity of initiator, though sex worker initiated
bargaining is less likely to fail.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Sex workers and Clients
Venue
Street Nightclub Total
No. Sales Sale(%) No. Sales Sale(%) Sales Sale(%)
Country (Sex Worker)
China 59 295 36.1 24 101 13.3 396 25.2
Thailand 58 265 32.4 30 167 22.1 432 27.4
Vietnam 38 145 17.7 5 22 2.9 167 10.6
Indonesia 16 83 10.2 5 23 3.0 106 6.7
SgpIndian 6 29 3.5 14 74 9.8 103 6.5
Malaysia 0 0 0.0 20 101 13.3 101 6.4
Taiwan 0 0 0.0 28 147 19.4 147 9.3
Philippines 0 0 0.0 20 116 15.3 116 7.4
Romania 0 0 0.0 1 6 0.8 6 0.4
Ethnicity (Clients)
Chinese 296 36.4 308 40.7 604 38.5
JapaneseKorean 56 6.9 82 10.8 138 8.8
Caucasian 107 13.1 202 26.7 309 19.7
Middle Eastern 36 4.4 74 9.8 110 7.0
Indian 86 10.6 55 7.3 141 9.0
Malay 60 7.4 23 3.0 83 5.3
Bangladeshi 167 20.5 1 0.1 168 10.7
Black(American) 177 6 0.7 147 11 1.5 17 1.1
Total 817 100.0 757 100.0 1574 100.0
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Table 3.2: Sex workers’ Characteristics
Venue
Street Nightclub Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Education
Illiterate 175 21.5 67 8.9 242 15.4
Primary 442 54.3 405 53.5 847 53.9
Secondary 149 18.3 196 25.9 345 22.0
High School 35 4.3 86 11.4 121 7.7
College 13 1.6 3 0.4 16 1.0
Marital Status
Single 571 69.9 687 90.8 1258 79.9
Married 83 10.2 19 2.5 102 6.5
Divorced 152 18.6 46 6.1 198 12.6
Widow 11 1.3 5 0.7 16 1.0
Urban
Rural 547 67.7 566 78.7 1113 72.9
Urban 261 32.3 153 21.3 414 27.1
Child
No 644 78.9 697 92.3 1341 85.4
Yes 172 21.1 58 7.7 230 14.6
Beauty Rating
Equal or Below Median 478 58.7 309 40.8 787 50.1
Above Median 336 41.3 448 59.2 784 49.9
Figure Rating
Equal or Below Median 468 57.5 302 39.9 770 49.0
Above Median 346 42.5 455 60.1 801 51.0
Total 817 100.0 757 100.0 1574 100.0
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Table 3.3: Client’s Characteristics
Venue Total
Street Nightclub
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Client’s Type
Repeat Clients 140 17.2 169 22.3 309 19.7
No Repeating Locals 170 20.9 173 22.9 343 21.8
Tourists 205 25.2 301 39.8 506 32.2
Foreign Worker 299 36.7 114 15.1 413 26.3
Regular to Venue
I don’t know 404 49.6 90 11.9 494 31.4
No 316 38.8 445 58.8 761 48.4
Yes 92 11.3 221 29.2 313 19.9
No Language Barrier
No 625 76.8 559 73.8 1184 75.4
Yes 189 23.2 198 26.2 387 24.6
Attractive Rating
Equal or Below Median 526 64.6 287 37.9 813 51.8
Above Median 266 32.7 456 60.2 722 46.0
Outfit Rating
Equal or Below Median 619 76.0 413 54.6 1032 65.7
Above Median 145 17.8 334 44.1 479 30.5
Total 814 100.0 757 100.0 1571 100.0
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Table 3.4: Bargainer’s Action (by Client Type)
Client’s Type Sex Worker Approach First Sex Worker Initiate Offer
Full Sample
Tourists 0.61 0.8
Foreign Workers 0.52 0.79
No Repeating Locals 0.68 0.81
Repeat Clients 0.78 0.84
All 0.64 0.81
Street
Tourists 0.81 0.92
Foreign Workers 0.58 0.83
No Repeating Locals 0.74 0.81
Repeat Clients 0.68 0.78
All 0.69 0.84
Nightclub
Tourists 0.47 0.73
Foreign Workers 0.39 0.67
No Repeating Locals 0.63 0.81
Repeat Clients 0.86 0.89
All 0.58 0.77
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Table 3.5: Statistics of Prices (by Client Type)
Panel A: Sex Workers Initiate Price
Client’s Type Initial Price Obs Initial Price* Final Price Obs
Street
Tourists 84.65 185 85.00 76.24 173
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 58.34 247 57.44 52.21 187
No Repeating Locals 70.93 137 70.74 65.13 130
Repeat Clients 78.35 109 78.33 73.29 108
All 71.28 678 72.04 65.78 598
Nightclub
Tourists 260.55 218 262.37 225.40 175
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 273.92 74 274 221.51 53
No Repeating Locals 257.07 140 257.12 222.72 125
Repeat Clients 263.88 147 266.25 234.44 143
All 262.26 579 263.45 226.92 496
Panel B: Clients Initiate Price
Client’s Type Initial Price Obs Final Price Obs
Street
Tourists 129.41 17 121.33 121.33 15
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 88.70 50 99.88 100.5 40
No Repeating Locals 73.91 32 74.61 73.40 25
Repeat Clients 92.42 31 93.83 93.17 30
All 91.26 130 95.23 95.18 110
Nightclub
Repeat Clients 250 18 250 237.22 18
No Repeating Locals 243.03 33 238.33 240.42 24
Tourists 225.12 82 242.08 270 52
Foreign Workers 204.32 37 219.10 253.64 22
All 226.70 170 238.21 255.69 116
Initial Price* refers to initial price of successful negotiations.
Notice that many of the final price is larger than the initial price In Panel B.
That is because most of these transactions closed at the initial price and some of the deals fail to close,
which leaves a smaller sample to be used to calculate average final price.
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Table 3.6: Statistics of Bargaining Outcome (by Client Type)
Panel A: Sex Workers Initiate Price
Client’s Type No Bargain Bargain Time Bargain Fail Price Cut
Street
Tourists 0.28 3.86 0.06 0.46
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 0.24 3.04 0.24 0.27
No Repeating Locals 0.34 2.74 0.04 0.30
Repeat Clients 0.42 2.84 0.01 0.25
All 0.30 3.20 0.12 0.33
Nightclub
Tourists 0.26 4.05 0.19 0.47
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 0.19 4.74 0.26 0.49
No Repeating Locals 0.26 4.66 0.11 0.49
Repeat Clients 0.44 3.02 0.02 0.40
All 0.30 3.99 0.13 0.46
Panel B: Clients Initiate Price
Street
Tourists 0.18 10.21 0.12 0
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 0.20 5.30 0.20 0
No Repeating Locals 0.25 3.26 0.19 0
Repeat Clients 0.35 6.89 0.03 0
All 0.25 6.11 0.15 0
Nightclub
Tourists 0.21 4.56 0.35 0
No Repeating Non-locals No Tourist 0.19 5.24 0.41 0
No Repeating Locals 0.21 4.86 0.27 0
Repeat Clients 0.22 6.57 0 0
All 0.21 5.02 0.31 0
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Table 3.7: Estimating Bargaining Duration (Sex Workers Initiate Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile (p50) Quantile (p50) Quantile (p75) Quantile (p75) Tobit Tobit
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients -1.489∗∗∗ -2.668∗∗∗ -0.885∗ -1.814∗∗∗ -2.085∗∗∗ -3.065∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.588) (0.476) (0.610) (0.642) (0.686)
Non-Repeating Locals 0.327 0.133 0.690 0.100 1.018 0.223
(0.496) (0.626) (0.505) (0.648) (0.670) (0.714)
Foreign Worker 1.193∗∗ 0.786 1.402∗∗∗ 0.662 2.418∗∗∗ 1.252∗
(0.512) (0.640) (0.521) (0.663) (0.692) (0.727)
Venue(Street=0) -3.859∗∗∗ 1.154∗ -4.214∗∗∗ 0.717 -6.380∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗
(0.707) (0.591) (0.721) (0.612) (0.990) (0.675)
Repeat Client to Venue 0.010∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Initial Price(ln) 3.971∗∗∗ 4.533∗∗∗ 7.029∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.488) (0.681)
Sex Worker’s Beauty(Above Median=1) -0.432 -0.167 -0.255 0.066 -0.572 0.114
(0.360) (0.453) (0.367) (0.469) (0.489) (0.519)
Client’s Attractiveness(Above Median=1) 0.414 0.983∗∗ 0.717∗ 0.868∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.970∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.469) (0.378) (0.486) (0.503) (0.537)
Client’s Outfit(Above Median=1) -0.242 -0.293 -0.837∗∗ -0.576 -0.718 -0.440
(0.361) (0.457) (0.368) (0.474) (0.495) (0.528)
No Language Barrier -0.582 -0.278 -0.513 0.176 -0.617 -0.150
(0.558) (0.707) (0.569) (0.733) (0.752) (0.806)
Transaction Day(Weekday=0) -0.409 -0.449 0.226 -0.030 -0.188 -0.464
(0.327) (0.415) (0.334) (0.430) (0.444) (0.476)
Income Above Mean -0.720∗ -0.029 -1.011∗∗ -0.699 -1.311∗∗ 0.072
(0.389) (0.478) (0.396) (0.496) (0.527) (0.546)
Constant -13.121∗∗∗ 4.128∗∗∗ -13.371∗∗∗ 6.671∗∗∗ -27.890∗∗∗ 3.027∗∗∗
(2.213) (0.843) (2.255) (0.874) (3.145) (0.957)
Observations 914 914 914 914 914 914
Likelihood -1764.580 -1820.200
Even columns are estimations without controlling for initial price
Tobin Regression estimations are based on truncation of bargain duration at upper limit of 10 minutes and lower limit of 0 minute
Coefficient estimates of sex worker’s country, age, experience and client’s age are omitted in this table
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Table 3.8: Estimating Bargaining Duration (Clients Initiate Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile (p50) Quantile (p50) Quantile (p75) Quantile (p75) Tobit Tobit
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients -0.006 -0.754 0.715 3.053 0.178 0.510
(1.664) (1.743) (1.973) (2.366) (2.874) (2.970)
Non-Repeating Locals -0.579 0.125 2.490 3.616∗ 2.138 2.144
(1.368) (1.432) (1.621) (1.944) (2.317) (2.387)
Foreign Worker -0.924 0.671 -0.209 0.651 1.589 2.129
(1.206) (1.259) (1.429) (1.710) (2.006) (2.072)
Venue(Street=0) 6.245∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗ 10.748∗∗∗ 3.498∗ 13.564∗∗∗ 6.296∗∗
(1.932) (1.528) (2.290) (2.075) (3.448) (2.553)
Repeat Client to Venue 0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.017 0.004 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024)
Initial Price(ln) -2.393∗∗ -3.729∗∗∗ -5.757∗∗∗
(1.034) (1.226) (1.766)
Sex Worker’s Beauty(Above Median=1) 1.573 1.039 2.862∗∗ 3.069∗∗ 4.704∗∗∗ 3.653∗∗
(0.961) (0.994) (1.139) (1.350) (1.661) (1.658)
Client’s Attractiveness(Above Median=1) 0.726 0.810 0.471 -0.423 2.666∗ 2.468
(0.913) (0.956) (1.083) (1.298) (1.545) (1.593)
Client’s Outfit(Above Median=1) -1.088 -1.229 -0.768 -1.110 -2.264 -2.810∗
(0.946) (0.984) (1.121) (1.336) (1.639) (1.696)
No Language Barrier -1.243 -0.208 -2.938 -4.892∗∗ -2.130 -2.905
(1.558) (1.627) (1.847) (2.209) (2.621) (2.716)
Transaction Day(Weekday=0) 0.081 0.374 2.124∗∗ 0.835 1.439 1.870
(0.864) (0.897) (1.024) (1.218) (1.434) (1.483)
Income Above Mean 1.612 0.521 -0.300 -0.450 2.133 1.727
(1.031) (1.077) (1.222) (1.463) (1.714) (1.767)
Constant 11.461∗∗ 0.217 15.775∗∗∗ 2.823 17.454∗∗ -7.338∗
(5.074) (2.347) (6.014) (3.187) (8.151) (3.973)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154
Likelihood -275.663 -281.345
Even columns are estimations without controlling for initial price
Tobin Regression estimations are based on truncation of bargain duration at upper limit of 10 minutes and lower limit of 0 minute
Coefficient estimates of sex worker’s country, age, experience and client’s age are omitted in this table
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Table 3.9: Bargaining Outcomes (Sex Workers Initiate Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Bargain No Bargain Bargain Fail Bargain Fail Final Price Final Price Final Price
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients 0.185∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.018 -0.101∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020)
Non-Repeating Locals 0.031 0.065 -0.070∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.020 -0.160∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022)
Foreign Worker -0.188∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024)
Venue(Street=0) 0.275∗∗∗ -0.072∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.039) (0.043) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053)
Repeat Client to Venue -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial Price(ln) -0.315∗∗∗ -0.000 0.752∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Sex Worker’s Beauty(Above Median=1) 0.008 -0.028 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.027 0.134∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.043)
Client’s Attractiveness(Above Median=1) -0.069∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.015 0.048∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017)
Client’s Outfit(Above Median=1) 0.001 -0.013 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.026
(0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016)
No Language Barrier 0.013 -0.005 -0.030 -0.030 0.009 -0.001 0.012
(0.045) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027)
Transaction Day(Weekday=0) 0.010 0.014 0.044∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.013 0.018
(0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Income Above Mean -0.041 -0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.048∗∗ -0.004 0.205∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.044)
Bargain Time -0.022∗∗∗
(0.001)
Constant 0.936∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 4.223∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.095) (0.055)
Observations 1169 1169 1169 1169 1007 908 1007
Likelihood -635.400 -668.793 -382.592 -382.592
R2 Within 0.629 0.728 0.324
Even columns are estimations without controlling for initial price
Column (1)-(4) presents marginal effects from Probit Regression; Column (5)-(7) presents sex worker’s fixed-effects estimates
Both initial price and bargaining duration are removed in column (7)
Coefficient estimates of sex worker’s country, age, experience and client’s age are omitted in this table
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Table 3.10: Bargaining Outcomes (Clients Initiate Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Bargain Bargaintime Bargain Fail Bargain Fail Final Price Final Price Final Price
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients 0.085 0.076 -0.444∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.101∗ -0.054 -0.072
(0.102) (0.105) (0.146) (0.147) (0.061) (0.069) (0.080)
Non-Repeating Locals -0.004 -0.017 -0.154∗ -0.133 -0.053 -0.008 -0.072
(0.087) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085) (0.051) (0.056) (0.067)
Foreign Worker -0.045 -0.063 -0.065 -0.052 0.009 -0.004 -0.008
(0.077) (0.078) (0.074) (0.075) (0.048) (0.048) (0.066)
Venue(Street=0) -0.415∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.089) (0.115) (0.087) (0.086) (0.098) (0.115)
Repeat Client to Venue 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Initial Price(ln) 0.172∗∗∗ -0.091 0.636∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.059) (0.042) (0.048)
Sex Worker’s Beauty(Above Median=1) -0.146∗∗ -0.125∗∗ 0.039 0.026 0.014 0.023 0.139
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.048) (0.050) (0.086)
Client’s Attractiveness(Above Median=1) -0.071 -0.061 -0.182∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.020 -0.024
(0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.038) (0.039) (0.052)
Client’s Outfit(Above Median=1) 0.031 0.050 -0.133∗∗ -0.150∗∗ 0.050 0.064∗ 0.046
(0.059) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065) (0.035) (0.037) (0.047)
No Language Barrier -0.019 0.014 0.086 0.056 -0.097∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.071
(0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) (0.058) (0.068) (0.079)
Transaction Day(Weekday=0) -0.019 -0.030 -0.000 0.005 -0.068∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.034) (0.035) (0.044)
Income Above Mean -0.105∗ -0.076 -0.110∗ -0.131∗∗ 0.101∗ 0.084 0.243∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.052) (0.055) (0.093)
Bargain Time 0.009∗∗
(0.004)
Constant 1.601∗∗∗ 1.746∗∗∗ 4.244∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.234) (0.157)
Observations 244 244 244 244 173 153 173
Likelihood -120.652 -124.094 -114.738 -115.876
R2 Within 0.349 0.434 0.186
Standard errors in parentheses
Even columns are estimations without controlling for initial price
Column (1)-(4) presents marginal effects from Probit Regression; Column (5)-(7) presents sex worker’s fixed-effects estimates
Both initial price and bargaining duration are removed in column (7)
Coefficient estimates of sex worker’s country, age, experience and client’s age are omitted in this table
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Table 3.11: Bargaining Outcome Interact By Venue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Bargain Bargaintime Bargain Fail Final Price
Panel A: Street
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients 0.287∗∗∗ -2.720∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.956) (0.105) (0.032)
Non-Repeating Locals 0.166∗∗ -0.694 -0.114∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.945) (0.058) (0.033)
Foreign Worker -0.139∗∗ -0.745 0.166∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.883) (0.040) (0.034)
Client Type (Base=Non-Repeating Locals)
Repeat Clients 0.122∗∗ -2.026∗∗ -0.135 0.060∗
(0.061) (0.902) (0.093) (0.031)
Tourist -0.166∗∗ 0.694 0.114∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.945) (0.058) (0.033)
Foreign Worker -0.304∗∗∗ -0.051 0.281∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.071) (1.028) (0.060) (0.038)
Observations 595 454 595 515
Likelihood -331.329 -181.295
R2 Within 0.486
Panel B: Nightclub
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients 0.193∗∗∗ -2.012∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.039
(0.048) (0.650) (0.053) (0.025)
Non-Repeating Locals 0.001 0.507 -0.055 -0.097∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.714) (0.040) (0.029)
Foreign Worker -0.096 1.743∗∗ 0.028 -0.100∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.859) (0.041) (0.035)
Client Type (Base=Non-Repeating Locals)
Repeat Clients 0.191∗∗∗ -2.519∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.053) (0.710) (0.057) (0.027)
Tourist -0.001 -0.507 0.055 0.097∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.714) (0.040) (0.029)
Foreign Worker -0.097 1.236 0.082∗ -0.003
(0.071) (0.919) (0.045) (0.037)
Observations 574 460 574 492
Likelihood -315.112 -191.904
R2 Within 0.107
Only subsample of sex worker initiated price is used
Same set of independent variables are controlled as in previous tables, but only selected coefficients are presented
Initial price is not controlled in all regressions, bargaining duration is also not added in last regression in column(4)
Column (1) & (3) are marginal effects from probit regression
Column (2) are estimates from quantile regression at median
Column (4) is sex workers’ fixed-effects estimates
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Table 3.12: Bargaining Outcome Interact with Venue
(1) (2) (3)
No Bargain Bargaintime Bargain Fail
Client Type (Base=Tourist)
Repeat Clients 0.257∗∗∗ -3.025∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗
(0.060) (0.835) (0.100)
Non-Repeating Locals 0.144∗∗ -1.024 -0.083
(0.060) (0.820) (0.051)
Foreign Worker -0.110∗∗ -0.102 0.138∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.753) (0.037)
Venue(Street=0) -0.039 0.483 0.135∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.698) (0.039)
Repeat Clients X Venue -0.050 0.695 0.027
(0.075) (1.023) (0.109)
Non-Repeating Locals X Venue -0.134∗ 1.751∗ 0.013
(0.075) (1.006) (0.058)
Foreign Worker X Venue 0.027 1.814 -0.103∗∗
(0.082) (1.113) (0.050)
Observations 1169 914 1169
Likelihood -666.660 -379.673
Standard errors in parentheses
Same set of independent variables are controlled as in previous tables, but only selected coefficients are presented
Only subsample of sex worker initiated price is used
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